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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of implementing the static and dynamic 
volatility interruption rule on idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
Using EGARCH and GARCH models to estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility, we find 
that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns increase as stock prices hit the upper 
static or dynamic volatility interruption limits. Conversely, we find that the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns decrease as stock prices hit the lower static or dynamic 
volatility interruption limit. We also find that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility is higher 
when stock prices reach the upper dynamic limit than when they reach the upper static limit. 
Furthermore, we compare the conditional idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns on the limit 
hit days to the day before and after the limit hit events and find that the conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility and stock returns are more volatile on the limits hit days. To test the volatility spill-over 
hypothesis, we set a range of a two-day window after limit hit events and find no evidence for 
volatility spill-over one or two days after the limit hit event, indicating that the static and dynamic 
volatility interruption rule is effective in curbing the volatility. Finally, we sort stocks by their size 
and find that small market cap stocks gain higher returns than larger market cap stocks upon 
reaching the upper limits, both static and dynamic. 
 
JEL Classification: G1, G2, F3.  
Keywords: Circuit breakers, price limits, static and dynamic volatility interruption, limit 
hit events, trading halts, conditional idiosyncratic volatility, volatility spill-over, market 
capitalization, stock return.
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CHAPTER 1 
The Impact of Static and Dynamic Interruptions Mechanism on Idiosyncratic Volatility in 
NASDAQ Stockholm 
 
1. Introduction: 
1.1. Background: 
The goal of market regulators and policymakers is to enhance the efficiency of financial 
markets while preventing markets from a sudden meltdown due to bad news, high frequency 
trading, manipulations, or market panic. For this, regulators continuously impose new rules and 
regulations on financial markets. Following the market crash of October 19, 1987 and in light of 
the Black Monday, a growing number of regulatory reports and academic papers discussed the 
event of the 1987 crash and whether regulations around that time were effective in absorbing the 
shock. They also proposed different trading mechanisms to help market regulators improve 
financial markets.  
Circuit breakers were first proposed by former United Stated Treasury Secretary, Nicholas 
Brady, after the 1987 market crash. They were first imposed on the New York Stock Exchange in 
1987 after the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged by 22.6%. The Brady Commission 
(1988) suggests implementing market wide circuit breakers. The report also suggests that trading 
halts should not be triggered frequently, suggesting setting high bounds for circuit breakers. 
Moreover, The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), known as the Miller Report, reports that 
any implementation of price limits should be carefully evaluated to help ameliorate issues related 
to the first hours of trading1. However, in 1988, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
SEC, issued a report that was not in favor of any trading halts or price limits mechanisms imposed 
                                                          
1 For more information see:  (1) Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). "Final Report on Stock 
Index Futures and Cash Market Activity during October 1987 to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission." The Division of Economic Analysis and the Division of the Trading and Markets, January 
1988. (2) U.S. General Accounting Office. "Financial Markets: Preliminary Observations on the October 
1987 Crash." Report to the Congressional Requesters, January 1988. (3) Brown, S. and Warner, J. "Using 
Daily Stock Returns."/our/ia/ of Financial Economics 14 (1985), 3-31. Chicago Board of Trade. "The 
Report of the Chicago Board of Trade to the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms." December 
1987. 
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on stock markets. They claim that mechanisms such as different time openings for different 
financial markets are more effective in facing market swings.  
Lehmann (1989) defines circuit breakers as “devices for halting or limiting trading when 
prices move too much.” In general, circuit breakers halts are imposed when a financial asset 
reaches a certain threshold, +/-10% for example, depending on the rules of that specific market. 
Once a halt is triggered, the index or stock in this case cannot be traded for a certain period of 
time that could amount to minutes, hours, or even an entire day depending on market regulations 
to allow for the volatility of the halted asset to drop. Thus, circuit breakers can be thought of as 
some temporary pauses on trading a specific financial asset once they reach a certain threshold. 
Overall, circuit breakers temporarily put the market on hold due to a sudden surge or downfall 
to allow for the market to adjust and prevent massive collapses from occurring. Countries such 
as Japan, France, China, South Korea, and many more followed the United States in imposing 
circuit breakers in their financial markets. 
 
1.2. Development of Circuit Breakers: 
Moser (1990) identifies three types of circuit breakers: order-imbalance circuit breakers, 
volume-induced circuit breakers, and price-change circuit breakers. Moser explains that “Order-
imbalance circuit breakers are intended to protect the interests of market makers in specialist 
markets. Volume-induced circuit breakers are intended to protect the viability of back-office 
operations. Price change circuit breakers are intended to bring excessive volatility under control.” 
The 2010 Flash Crash Market questioned the effectiveness of market-wide circuit breakers 
and encouraged regulators to re-engineer circuit breakers to fit specific market characteristics. 
Hence, modified versions of circuit breakers have been introduced in many international financial 
markets. 
Abad and Pascual (2013) point out two main types of circuit breakers: price limits and trading 
halts. They distinguish between two types of price limits, daily price limits and intraday price 
limits. Daily price limits, also known as the order rejection model, are a volatility stabilizer 
mechanism that puts some upper and lower bounds on trading, curbing the day-to-day volatility. 
To explain, regulators set a daily percentage range of trading that is based on previous day’s 
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closing price. Thus, stock prices cannot neither exceed nor go below the price limit bounds, 
allowing the market to stabilize. Once the daily price limits are triggered, trades beyond price 
limits cannot be executed. The intraday price limits, known as volatility interruption (VI 
hereafter), are more sophisticated models of the daily price limits. The VI mechanism combines 
(1) an intraday price limits, known as the dynamic VI, that are based around the last traded 
orderbook price, and (2) daily price limits, known as the static VI, that are based around the last 
auction price, which may have been the price traded in VI from earlier that day, the opening 
auction, or in case there was no trade for either of these, then the official closing price of the 
previous day. The dynamic VI is triggered when the difference between a stock’s most recent 
execution price and potential execution price exceeds a specified price range, while the static VI 
is triggered when the difference between the price at the previous call auction and the potential 
execution price exceeds specified price range.  Therefore, it is logical for the range of the static VI 
to be wider than the dynamic one. It is important to note that some markets adopt dynamic VI 
exclusively. 
Abad and Pascual (2013) also distinguish between two types of trading halts, asset-specific 
trading halts and market-wide trading halts. The market-wide trading halt is a discretionary 
model and trading halts are activated under specific circumstances determined by market 
regulators such as recessions or market turmoil. Unlike the asset-specific trading halts model, 
trading halts in a market-wide model may include all financial instruments or certain securities. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of implementing the static and dynamic 
VI on idiosyncratic volatility in Nasdaq Stockholm. Static and dynamic VI were adopted around 
the same time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of static 
and dynamic VI on idiosyncratic volatility and the volatility spill-over. In fact, this is the first 
paper to ever study the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and any type of circuit 
breakers around the world, not only static and dynamic VI, including price limits and trading 
halts. Previous studies have examined the impact of VI on price discovery, information 
asymmetry, adverse selection and market quality, but none deal with idiosyncratic volatility. 
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As far as contribution is concerned, this paper contributes to the body of literature in many 
ways. First, this paper enriches the literature on Market Microstructure by providing new 
evidence from NASDAQ OMX Nordic on the impact of the newly introduced static and dynamic 
VI mechanism on the market. The mainstream of papers discussing VI in the market 
microstructure literature focus on their impact on price discovery, market quality, and 
information asymmetry; hence, this paper expands the VI literature by looking at different angles, 
such as the idiosyncratic volatility and the volatility spill-over hypothesis. Second, it also adds 
value to the price limits and circuit breakers literature since VI is one form of price limits 
discussed by Abad and Pascual (2013). Third, we believe this paper is a great addition to the asset 
pricing literature. There are two opposing views on the relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and the cross sectional of stock returns. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show 
that there is a negative correlation between lagged realized idiosyncratic risk and returns, while 
Fu (2009) shows a positive correlation between conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using (EGARCH) models and expected stock returns. This paper sheds the light on the effect of 
VI on idiosyncratic volatility while providing supporting evidence to the literature. Finally, this 
paper contributes to the portfolio management literature by providing insights to portfolio 
manager on the level of risk, measured by idiosyncratic volatility, that can be expected from 
stocks that frequently hit the upper or lower limits. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 reviews relevant literature 
review, motivation, and hypotheses development. Sections 3 describes the data and methodology 
used in our analyses. Section 4 presents and interprets the results. Section 5 summarizes the 
findings and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review, Motivation, and Hypotheses Development: 
2.1 Literature Review: 
2.1.1 Literature Review Related to Circuit Breaker and Price Limits: 
The literature in price limits identifies two opposing views. Some claim that price limits 
improve financial markets quality and others claim otherwise. Lehmann (1989) argues that in 
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markets where price limits are imposed, the imbalance of supply and demand in daily trading 
causes the prices to reach the limits. Hence, volatility increases in longer horizons, causing 
liquidity to drop. Subrahmanyam (1994) investigates the impact of circuit breakers on market 
volatility. The results show that the implementation of circuit breakers causes market volatility 
to surge and therefore, market liquidity to drop. Moreover, Diacogiannis, Patsalis, Tsangarakis, 
and Tsiritakis (2005) examine the impact of imposing price limits on overreactions in Athens 
Stock Exchange and find evidence of short-term overreaction during periods of one day upper 
limit hit, two days upper limit hits, three days upper limit hits, and one day lower limit hit. 
George and Hwang (1995) select a sample of stocks from the Tokyo stocks exchange to 
examine the volatility of the daily returns based on the opening and closing prices and its relation 
to price limits. They find that for highly traded stocks in Tokyo stocks exchange, volatility is 
higher for opening price compared to closing price. This indicates that close-to-close returns are 
higher, because of lower volatility, than open-to-open returns. This finding contradicts with the 
goal of price limit rule, concluding that price limit rule increases volatility. 
Kim and Rhee (1997) study the price limit performance in Tokyo Stock Exchange. They begin 
by examining the claims of support and opposition of the price limit rule. They state that 
advocates of the price limits rule believe that such mechanism helps mitigate stock price volatility; 
does not affect trading movement; and reduces overreaction. On the other side, opponents of this 
rule claim that price limit causes higher volatility in the long-run (volatility spillover), negatively 
affecting (delaying) the price discovery process. Since price limits restrict trading, opponents 
argue that trading activity will get affected accordingly. The paper examines both sides of the 
argument and concludes that price limits do not curb volatility for stocks that reach price limits 
more frequently as fast as stocks that do not normally hit the price limit. This is in line with the 
findings of Lehmann (1989) and George and Hwang (1995). They also show that stocks that reach 
price limits tend to delay price discovery, compared to stocks that do not reach price limits. This 
is consistent with Fama (1989) who shows that circuit breakers delay price discovery and increase 
volatility. 
Cho, Russell, Tiao, and Tsay (2002) use high frequency data in their empirical work to 
investigate the magnet effect of price limits in Taiwan Stock Exchange. The magnet effect of price 
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limit is the tendency for a stock price to accelerate towards the upper limit as the stock price gets 
close to the upper bound. However, the opposite does not hold true. As a matter of fact, stock 
prices tend to move solely toward the lower limit as they get closer to the lower bound. The 
empirical results confirm the existence of the magnet effect, which is caused by the illiquidity risk 
and investors behavior in Taiwan Stock Exchange. To confirm the accuracy of their model in 
capturing the magnet effect, they apply their model on the S&P 500 where the price limit rule is 
not applicable. The results show no evidence of the magnet effect. 
Tooma (2011) investigates the existence of the magnet effect of price limits in the Egyptian 
stock exchange for the period from 1997 to 2002, where a 5 percent price limit was imposed. The 
paper uses pooled time series data for two sub-groups of firms; one for the period when price 
limit was imposed and another for when it was not in place in order to apply a logit model of 
probability of hitting the 5 percent limit. Results show that the change in the coefficient between 
periods, when price limits were not imposed compared to the period when they were imposed, 
is consistent with the magnet effect hypothesis. The coefficient indicates that the magnet effect is 
higher in the period when the price limit was imposed compared to the period when price limit 
rule was not in effect. In other words, the probability of reaching the price limit has increased 
after imposing the price limit rule, consistent with Cho et al (2002). 
Advocates of the price limit rule, on the other hand, regard price limits positively, claiming 
that price limits reduce price volatility. They argue that setting daily upper and lower bounds for 
stock prices to move within helps manage price volatility and gives room for market participants 
to cool off. This prevents investors from initiating a market panic and avoid overreaction, thus, 
allowing volatility to drop. 
Yang Chu, Ko, and Lee (2018) study the effect of price limits on continuing overreaction and 
momentum in Taiwan Stock Exchange and find that imposing price limits reduces investors 
overreaction. Kim and Yang (2003) investigate whether price limits can play a role in reducing 
overreaction in Taiwan Stock market under two hypotheses: the cooling-off hypothesis and the 
magnet hypothesis. They find that overreaction increases as prices are approaching price limits 
and decreases as prices sequentially hit the price limits. 
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Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2017) apply the propensity score matching techniques to narrow 
the sample selection bias in Kim and Rhee (1997). They show that price limits are effective in 
reducing the transitory volatility in days after price limits are hit. Moreover, they did not find any 
evidence of the volatility spill-over. These finding contradict with the finding of Kim and Rhee 
(1997).   
Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) investigate the effectiveness of price limits in the U.S. future market 
for four commodities: corn, silver, treasury bonds, and soybeans. The results indicate that price 
limits can be used as a device to monitor price movement and volatility in volatile markets. Ma 
et al (1989) point out three benefits for imposing price limits. First of all, price limits can be used 
to attenuate credit risk. Second, price limits can serve as a tool to prevent the market from 
overreacting as a result to news. Third, price limits can be used to prove that markets are not as 
liquid. 
Kim and Park (2010) introduce a manipulation-based model to test reasons behind the 
adoption of price limits in stock markets. Their model shows that imposing the price limit rule 
discourages market manipulation. They also argue that based on their model, a possible reason 
for market regulators to impose price limit rules is that the level of manipulation is high. They go 
on to modify their model to estimate price limits levels and conclude that markets with high levels 
of corruption and low public enforcement tend to have high price limits. 
Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2010) investigate whether or not price limits are bad for equity 
markets. They notice the growing literature criticizing price limits and decide to test it themselves. 
To do so, they gathered a sample of 58 stock markets, which represents about 80% of the world’s 
equity markets. Surprisingly, about 71 percent, 41 equity markets, out of the sample imposes the 
price limits rule.  They find that markets that impose price limits are characterized by low legal 
and technical development, low levels of transparency, higher corruption levels, and low 
business disclosure. These finding are consistent with their hypothesis even after robust.  
 
2.1.2 Literature Review Related to Volatility Interruptions: 
Due to the novelty of the VI, four papers have discussed the new mechanism. Kwon, Eom, 
La, and Park (2018) examine the effect of introducing the static and dynamic VI to the pre-existing 
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price limits in the Korean Stock Market. They find that the static VI has a weak impact in 
stabilizing price discovery, while the dynamic VI has a positive effect in stabilizing price 
discovery. They also find that static IV has limited effect as it provides similar results as the 
existing price limits system.  
Brugler and Linton (2014) study the role of static VI on market quality in London Stock 
Exchange. They argue that market quality become worse after a long suspension from lower static 
VI events. Nevertheless, they document that lower static VI helps in interrupting poor market 
quality to other stocks in times when the market is at distress. Finally, they show that upper static 
VI causes excessive trading spill-overs. 
Zimmermann (2013) examine the impact of VI on price discovery in Deutsche Börse Xetra. 
The study shows that “volatility interruptions contribute to about 36 percent of pre-interruption 
price uncertainty revelation.” The paper also claims that when VIs offers an accurate direction of 
price discovery, subsequent volatility drops. Lastly, the paper documents although market 
quality improve after an VI is triggered, market traders continue to be alert and watchful.  
Abad and Pascual (2010) observe the impact of the static VI on the Spanish Stock Exchange. 
They document a surge in information asymmetry risk prior to a VI halt, hypothesizing that 
informed traders anticipate their trading strategies arounds VI halts; they conclude that VI 
increases information asymmetry. Finally, the authors conclude that high levels of volatility, 
illiquidity and trading activities will remain in the market even after the introduction of the static 
VI mechanism.    
 
2.2. Motivation and Hypotheses Development  
After the 2010 flash crash, many European exchanges announced the introduction of a new 
trading mechanism aiming to reduce market volatility. On June 14, 2010, about one month after 
the flash crash, the Euronext introduced the Static VI, in addition to the pre-existing dynamic VI, 
to all its exchanges in Amsterdam, London, Paris, Lisbon, Brussels, and Dublin. Three months 
later, on September 30, 2010, NASDAQ OMX Nordic introduces an updated VI to its Nordic 
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markets to protect investors and listed companies form excess volatility. Nordic markets include 
Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Iceland exchanges. 
Similar to European exchanges, Asian exchanges follow suit. On September 1, 2014, The 
Korean Stock Exchange introduced the dynamic VI and on June 15, 2015, they announced the 
introduction of the static VI.  
 In this paper, we only focus on one type of circuit breaker, the VI mechanism, both static and 
dynamic. We examine the impact of VI on idiosyncratic volatility in Stockholm stock exchange. 
We chose Stockholm stock exchange for two main reasons. First, Stockholm stock exchange is the 
largest market in Nasdaq OMX Nordic and due to the fact that it is managed by Nasdaq, its level 
of efficiency is much higher compared to those locally managed in other European markets. 
Second, it adopts the VI mechanisms, both static and dynamic. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first paper to study the impact of VI on the idiosyncratic volatility and volatility spill-over.  
The main purpose of implementing the VI rule is to protect investors form excess volatility 
by mitigating day to day volatility. Nevertheless, the direction of stock prices, whether up or 
down, significantly impacts stock volatility. That is when prices are rising, which is approaching 
the upper static or dynamic limits, investors receive this as good news and rush to buy the share 
to make a profit. Investors’ overreaction to jumps in stock prices increases volatility. In fact, 
Diacogiannis et al (2005) provide evidence that overreaction is present when reaching the upper limits. 
Thus, we expect idiosyncratic volatility to increase as stock prices approach upper static and 
dynamic limits:  
H1: Idiosyncratic volatility increases when a stock hits the upper static limit. 
H2: Idiosyncratic volatility increases when a stock hits the upper dynamic limit. 
 
On the other hand, in the case of bad news, investors underreact to falling stock prices 
because they do not wish to sell their shares at lower prices, waiting for share prices to bounce 
back. Therefore, investors’ underreaction lowers volatility. This leads us to investigate the 
following hypotheses:  
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H3: Idiosyncratic volatility decreases when a stock hits the lower static limits. 
      H4: Idiosyncratic volatility decreases when a stock hits the lower dynamic limits. 
 
Furthermore, because dynamic VI has lower range than static VI, we should observe more 
frequent dynamic hits than static hits. In fact, it has been documented in this study that we have 
more dynamic limit occurrences than static limit occurrences. We will be discussing this in more 
details in the descriptive statistics section. This leads us to hypothesize that investors will be more 
concerned with the dynamic hits than with the static hits due to their frequent limit hits, which 
may create some panic among investor and increases stock volatility as a result. Hence, we wish 
to test the following hypotheses:  
 
H5: Stocks that reach the upper dynamic limits witness higher idiosyncratic volatility than 
stocks that reach the upper static limits. 
 
To further investigate hypotheses 1 and 2 by looking at the idiosyncratic volatility one day 
before and day after the limit hit day for both upper static and dynamic. We expect our earlier 
hypotheses to hold. That is, idiosyncratic volatility is higher on the upper limit hit day 
compared to the day before and the day after the limit hit. We test the following hypotheses:   
 
H6: Idiosyncratic volatility is higher on days when the static upper limit is reached compared to 
the day before and the day after.  
 
H7: Idiosyncratic volatility is higher on days when the dynamic upper limit is reached compared 
to the day before and the day after. 
 
Similarly, we further investigate hypotheses 3 and 4 and test the following hypotheses: 
 
H8: Idiosyncratic volatility is lower on days when the static lower limit is reached compared to 
the day before and the day after.  
 
H9: Idiosyncratic volatility is lower on days when the dynamic lower limit is reached compared 
to the day before and the days after. 
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The literature proposes two opposing views on whether or not trading mechanisms cause 
volatility spill-over after the limits are reached (i.e. Kim and Rhee (1997) and Deb, Kalev, and 
Marisetty (2017)). This motivates us to investigate the spill-over hypothesis within the scope of 
the static and dynamic VI mechanisms. Hence, we wish to test the following hypotheses: 
H10: Idiosyncratic volatility starts to decline one day after a stock reaches the static upper limits 
and continues to decline during the second day. 
 
H11: Idiosyncratic volatility starts to decline one day after a stock reaches the dynamic upper limits 
and continues to decline during the second day. 
 
H12: Idiosyncratic volatility starts to augment one day after a stock reaches the static lower limits 
and declines during the second day. 
 
H13: Idiosyncratic volatility starts to augment one day after a stock reaches the dynamic lower 
limits and declines during the second day. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology:  
We obtain daily stock prices and related financial data from DATASTREAM. We obtain data 
on Swedish 3 months Treasury Bill from Sweden central bank (Riksbank). Fama and French 
factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Data for Stockholm spans from September 
30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. We chose September 30, 2010 to be the starting date for our sample 
because this is the date when static and dynamic VI was first put into effect. There are 378 stocks 
traded in Stockholm Stock Exchange. We drop stocks that were listed after December 29, 2017 or 
have observations less than one week. The final sample consists of 344 firms.  The table below 
summarizes the static and dynamic VI range in Nasdaq Stockholm: 
Exchange 
Static 
Limit 
(stock) 
Static 
Limit 
(Index) 
Dynamic 
Limit (stock) 
Dynamic 
Limit (Index) 
Suspension 
time for 
static 
Suspension 
time for 
dynamic 
Stockholm  
+/- 15% 
from 
opening  
+/- 10% 
from 
opening 
+/- 5% from 
the last 
traded price 
+/- 3% from 
the last 
traded price 
3 minutes 1 minute 
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To identify static and dynamic limit hit occurrences, we follow the following steps. We assume 
upper static limits are reached when any of the following conditions occur: 
 
Ht ≥ Ot + Static limit (15%)                                                                    (1a) 
                                   Ct ≥ Ot + Static limit (15%)                                                                     (1b)                                                           
where Ht and Ct  represent Day t’s high and close price, respectively, and Ot  represents Day t’s 
open price.  
We assume Lower static limits are reached when any of the following conditions occur: 
          Ct ≤ Ot - Static limit (15%)                                                                       (2a) 
          Lt ≤ Ot - Static limit (15%)                                                                         (2b) 
   where Lt represent Day t’s low and price 
Similarly, we assume upper dynamic limits are reached when any of the following conditions are 
met: 
                                 Ht ≥ Ot + Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                   (3a) 
                                Ct ≥ Ot + Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                    (3b) 
                                Ct ≥ Ht + Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                     (3c) 
And Lower dynamic limits are reached when any of the following conditions are met: 
                                  Lt ≤ Ot - Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                    (4a)    
                                  Ct ≤ Ot - Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                   (4b) 
                                 Ct ≤ Lt - Dynamic limit (5%)                                                                     (4c) 
Once we determine the number of upper and lower hits from static and dynamic VI, we 
estimate the idiosyncratic volatility. Fu (2009) and Spiegel and Wang (2005) use the EGARCH 
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model to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility, whereas Bali and Cakici (2008) GARCH and 
EGARCH to estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility. We employ two conditional time-
varying measures2 to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility: The exponential generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model (EGARCH) and the generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedastic model (GARCH). To estimate the idiosyncratic volatility, we assume 
Fama and French (1993) three-factors model, Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and Fama and 
French (2015) five-factors model. We estimate Fama and French (1993) three-factors model as 
follows: 
                        𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡  = 𝛽𝑖,𝑡( 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡  𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (5) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the risk-free rate, SMB 
is the return on a diversified portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio 
of big stocks, HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low 
B/M stocks, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is a zero-mean residual.  
 
We estimate Carhart (1997) four-factor model as follows: 
                                𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡  = 𝛽𝑖,𝑡( 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡  𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (6) 
Where the momentum factor, UMD, is calculated as the equal-weight average of the 
returns of small and big winners minus losers.  
We estimate Fama and French (2015) five-factors model as follows: 
                      𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡  = 𝛽𝑖,𝑡( 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (7) 
where RMW is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with 
robust and weak profitability, and CMA is the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of low (conservative) and high (aggressive) investment stocks. 
 
We use 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 from each model, the FF three-factor model, Carhart four-factors model and FF five-
factor model, to estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility. We use 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 as input in both 
                                                          
2 Fu(2009) and Spiegel and Wang (2005) confirm that estimating the idiosyncratic volatility using a conditional 
time-varying measures are superior to OLS based measure such as the methodology proposed by Ang et al (2006). 
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EGARCH and GARCH models. The first measure of conditional idiosyncratic volatility is the 
EGARCH model of Nelson (1991):  
                 ln(ℎ𝑡) = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1  ( 
Ɛ𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5  ) +  𝜆1  |
Ɛ𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5 | +  𝛽1  ln(ℎ𝑡−1)                           (8) 
 
Unlike other ARCH family models that use the value of 𝜀𝑡−1
2 , the EGARCH model 
employs Ɛt-1 as the level of standardized value. One of the unique functions of the EGARCH model 
is that it captures the leverage effect. When 
Ɛ𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5   is positive, the positive shocks indicate good 
news which causes less volatility. The impact of the positive shocks on the log conditional 
variance is then 𝛼1+ 𝜆1.  When  
Ɛ𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5   is negative however, the negative shocks indicate bad news 
which creates more volatility. The impact of the negative shocks on the log conditional variance 
is then -𝛼1+ 𝜆1.   
The Second measure of conditional idiosyncratic volatility is the GARCH model of 
Bollerslev (1986): 
                          ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 Ɛ𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ℎ𝑡−𝑖                                                 (9) 
Where p ≥ 0,  q ≥ 0 
            𝛼0 ≥ 0, 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0     i= 1, …., q, 
            𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0                 i= 1, …., p 
Following the literature, we use EGARCH (1, 1) process and GARCH (1, 1) process. The residuals 
from these processes are our conditional idiosyncratic volatility. 
In an attempt to reduce the effect of heteroskedasticity in our results, we take the natural 
logarithm of the idiosyncratic volatility measures following Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), 
Change and Dong (2004), Malkiel and Xu (2003), and Sias (1996). 
4. Results and Interpretations:  
 
15 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of 344 stocks in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period 
from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. The minimum stock return is -2.28% and the 
maximum is 2.32% with an average of -0.0016% stock return. We do not observe high spikes in 
stock return and this is due to the VI mechanism that restricts stocks from increasing or 
decreasing above or below certain range. Stocks liquidity is relatively high in Nasdaq Stockholm 
as indicated by the Amihud (2002) measure with a mean of -12.40. Moreover, stock volatility is 
considerably low with an average of 0.02%. As far as stock profitability is concerned, the average 
return on equity is 9.37% and the median is 11.67% indicating that stocks in Nasdaq Stockholm 
are profitable. The average firm leverage ratio and book to market ratio is 22.29% and 61.52%, 
respectively. Hence, stocks in Nasdaq Stockholm are characterized by being profitable, liquid, 
and possessing low levels of volatility for the period following the imposition of the VI 
mechanism in September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. 
The literature in asset pricing suggests that idiosyncratic volatility measures must be 
positively correlated. Ang et al (2009) show that the three idiosyncratic volatility measures used 
in his paper are highly positively correlated. Fu (2009) finds a positive, but moderate 0.46 
correlation between the conditional idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility 
constructed following Ang et al (2006). Following the literature, we use Paerson’s correlation 
matrix. Table 2 shows Paerson’s correlation matrix between the six conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility used in this study. The correlations between the idiosyncratic volatility measures in this 
study are highly positively, ranging from 0.82 to 0.99, and statically significant at 1%. 
Table 3 shows the VI occurrences for both static and dynamic limits sorted by year, market 
capitalization, and market sector. In total, 59,445 times the VI were triggered from September 30, 
2010 to December 29, 2017. Static limits were reached 3,618 times (2,252 static upper hits and 1,366 
static lower hits) compared with 55,827 for dynamic limits (27,259 and 28,568 limits hit for 
dynamic upper and lower limits, respectively). It is not surprising to observe greater dynamic VI 
occurrences than static because of the limit range. It is common to observe a stock reaching 5% 
from opening price but not common to observe a stock reaching 15% from yesterday’s closing 
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price, and this explains why we have more dynamic occurrences compared with their static 
counterparts. 
The year following the implementation of the VI rules, 2011, witnessed the highest VI 
occurrences with a total of 10,501 limit reaches. Out of the 10,501 hits, 288 static upper hits, 228 
static lower hits, 4,234 dynamic upper hits, and 5,751 dynamic lower hits. Moreover, small market 
cap stocks witnessed the highest VI occurrences with 30,882 compared with 8,173 and 20,390 for 
large and medium market cap stocks, respectively. It can be observed here that small market cap 
stocks are more volatile compared to large and medium market cap stocks. Moreover, medium 
market cap stocks are more volatile large market cap stocks. This is consistent with the literature 
that small size firms tend to be more volatile compared to their larger counterparts. Fu (2008) 
shows that “Small firms tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatilities than large firms.”3 
Furthermore, we sort stocks by their market sectors. Nasdaq Stockholm is divided into ten main 
sectors: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, 
Industrials, Oil and Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. Industrials and Health 
care sectors observed the highest VI occurrences with 13,549 and 13,371 limit hits, respectively. 
Conversely, Utilities and Telecommunications sectors witnessed the lowest VI occurrences with 
533 and 639 limit hits, respectively. 
4.2. Volatility Interruptions and Idiosyncratic Volatility: 
 
Now that we have estimated the conditional idiosyncratic volatility, we test our 
hypotheses. To test for the effect of VI on idiosyncratic volatility, we create four dummy variables: 
static upper, static lower, dynamic upper and dynamic lower hit events. Following Ferreira and 
Laux (2007), we estimate the following fixed effect regression model:  
           Ψ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏0 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2  (
𝑀
𝐵
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏3 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
             𝑏5 𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                     (10) 
 
                                                          
3 See also Duffee (1995) for more information. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. 
“Size” is the market capitalization “in millions of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of shares outstanding, 
“B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price, “Leverage”  Total liabilities to total assets ratio, 
“ROE” Net income over the difference between total assets and total liabilities, “ILLIQ”  Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity calculated the ratio of the 
absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity,  
“Closing price” stock daily closing price,  “Daily returns” stock daily return,  “Return volatility” daily return simple volatility. 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min 
  
Max 
 
Closing price 79.28 52.05 94.20 0.02 1,767.17 
Daily returns - 0.0016% 0.00% 1.38% -2.28% 2.32% 
Volatility 0.02% 0.01% 0.2% 0.0% 0.05% 
Leverage 22.29% 19.75% 18.35% 0.0% 56.15% 
ROE 9.37% 11.67% 13.24% -18.63% 26.50% 
ILLIQ -12.402 -12.19 3.09 -22.58 2.21 
B/M 61.52% 50.44% 40.35% 14.04% 138.45% 
Size 690 67.80 1,200 1.27 3,680 
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Table 2 “Paerson’s Correlation Matrix”: This table shows the Paerson’s correlation matrix among the different idiosyncratic volatility used in this 
study. Significance level is reported below each correlation.      
 
 
             |   EIVOL5   GIVOL5   EIVOL4   GIVOL4   EIVOL3   GIVOL3 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
   EIVOL5    |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
   GIVOL5    |   0.9985   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
   EIVOL4    |   0.9555   0.9646   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
   GIVOL4    |   0.9554   0.9641   0.9983   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
   EIVOL3    |   0.8272   0.8347   0.8416   0.8403   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
   GIVOL3    |   0.8259   0.8334   0.8403   0.8392   0.9984   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000           
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Table 3 “Volatility Interruptions Occurrences”: This table shows the volatility interruptions occurrences 
categorized by Static and Dynamic hits for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period from 
September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. 
Panel A: VI occurrences by year 
Year Static Upper Static Lower Dynamic Upper Dynamic Lower 
Occurrences 
Per Year 
2010 64 52 718 670 1,504 
2011 288 228 4,234 5,751 10,501 
2012 314 215 3,369 3,972 7,870 
2013 361 169 3,305 3,145 6,980 
2014 295 193 3,255 3,380 7,123 
2015 330 194 4,479 4,204 9,207 
2016 335 177 4,519 4,527 9,558 
2017 265 138 3,380 2,919 6,702 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
 
Panel B: VI occurrences by Market Capitalization: 
Size Static Upper Static Lower Dynamic Upper Dynamic Lower 
Occurrences 
MC 
Large Cap 118 82 3,987 3,986 8,173 
Medium Cap 641 325 9,987 9,437 20,390 
Small Cap 1,493 959 13,285 15,145 30,882 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
 
Panel C: VI occurrences by Sectors: 
Sector Static Upper Static Lower 
Dynamic 
Upper 
Dynamic 
Lower 
Occurrences 
Sector 
Basic Materials 114 56 1,915 1,787 3,872 
Consumer Goods 133 75 2,271 2,342 4,821 
Consumer Services 163 95 2,560 2,515 5,333 
Financials 227 130 3,024 3,374 6,755 
Health Care 602 310 5,985 6,474 13,371 
Industrials 387 248 6,288 6,626 13,549 
Oil & Gas 30 16 620 530 1,196 
Technology 558 423 4,058 4,334 9,373 
Telecommunications 8 5 274 352 639 
Utilities 30 8 264 234 533 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
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Where Ψ𝑖,𝑡 is the log conditional idiosyncratic volatility computed form either model (8) or (9), 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the VI dummy associated with conditions (1) to (4). 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the firm’s market 
capitalization,  (
𝑀
𝐵
)
𝑖,𝑡
 is the firm book-to-market ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the firm return on equity ratio, 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the firm debt to asset ratio, and 𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is volatility on ROE. It is important to point 
out that panel data settings might suffer from inflated t-statistics which could possibly lead to 
inaccurate inferences and conclusions. For this, we follow Rogers’ (1983, 1993) method to correct 
for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, or contemporaneous cross-sectional correlations of error 
terms by adjusting standard errors for clustering at the firm level. In addition to clustering the 
standard error, we include a year fixed effect dummy for each year in the sample to control for 
any economic changes as suggested by and Lins et al (2017).   We expect a positive relationship 
between the idiosyncratic volatility and LimitDUM StaticUpper and LimitDUM DynamicUpper. We also 
expect a negative relationship between the idiosyncratic and LimitDUM StaticLower and LimitDUM 
DynamicLower. Moreover, following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we expect a negative correlation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and B/M, size, and VROE, and a positive correlation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and ROE and Leverage. 
Table 4 presents the results of equation (10) using 6 different conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility measures. The main independent variable we wish to test is Static Upper, which is a 
limit dummy that takes the value of 1 if any of the conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable in column (1) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility 
estimated from an EGARCH model in equation (8) based on the the FF 3-factors model in 
equation (5), while dependent variable in column (2) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility 
estimated from a GARCH model in equation (9) based on the FF 3-factors model in equation (5). 
Similarly, the dependent variable in column (3) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility 
estimated from an EGARCH model in equation (8) constructed from the Carhart 4-factors model 
in equation (6) and the dependent variable in column (4) is the conditional idiosyncratic volatility 
estimated from a GARCH model in equation (9) and constructed from the Carhart 4-factors model 
in equation (6). The dependent variables in columns (5) and (6) is the conditional idiosyncratic 
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volatility estimated from an EGARCH and GARCH models in equations (8) and (9), respectively, 
and based on the FF 5-factors model in equation (7).  
As we expected, the coefficients of Static Upper are positive and statically significant at 1% level 
of significance through all six models 0.84, 0.85, 0.88, 0.88, 0.88, and 0.86 respectively.  The results 
of Table 4 indicate that when stocks reach the static upper limit, idiosyncratic volatility increases 
by an average of 84% to 88%, compared to stocks that did not hit the static upper limit. This 
evidence provides support to our first hypothesis that idiosyncratic volatility increases when 
stocks hit the static upper limit. Moreover, the signs of the control variables are as expected and 
consistent with Ferreira and Laux (2007), positive for ROE and Leverage and negative for Size, 
B/M, and VROE.  
Furthermore, the main independent variable in Table 5 is the dynamic upper limit. The 
coefficient of dynamic upper limit in all different models are positive and statically significant at 
1% significant level. These results indicate that when stocks reach the dynamic upper limit, the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases by an average of 94% to 98% compared to stocks that 
did not hit the dynamic upper limit. This result provides support to our second hypothesis that 
idiosyncratic volatility increases when stocks hit the dynamic upper limit. The signs of the control 
variables are as expected as well. 
Comparing the results from Tables 4 and 5, we observe that idiosyncratic volatility increases by 
94% to 98% when stocks reach the dynamic upper limits and 84% to 88% when they reach the 
upper static limit, a difference of about 10%. Thus, we conclude that stocks reaching the upper 
dynamic limits witness higher conditional idiosyncratic volatility and are more volatile than 
stocks reaching the upper static limits. Put differently, although the conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility increases as stocks reach static or dynamic upper limit, it is even higher when stocks 
reach the dynamic upper limit by an average of 10%.  This lends support to hypothesis 5. 
Table 6 presents the results of the impact of stocks reaching the static lower limit on the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility. Through all different models, the coefficients of the 
independent variable static lower are negative and statistically significant. This indicates that 
when stocks reach the static lower limit, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility decreases by an 
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Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (10). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH 
model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “Static Upper” which is a dummy 
variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and zero otherwise, “ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” 
Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price , “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE volatility. In 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 
344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
Expected 
Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
Static Upper + 
0.84 a 0.85 a 0.88 a 0.88 a 0.88 a 0.86 a 
(42.70) (42.94) (40.60) (40.67) (39.89) (41.09) 
ROE + 
0.20 a 0.21 a 0.22 a 0.23 a 0.21 a 0.22 a 
(3.39) (3.51) (3.80) (3.88) (3.74) (3.96) 
Size - 
-9.88e-11 -1.00e-10 a -1.19e-10 a -1.21e-10 a -1.12e-10 a -1.09e-10 a 
(-5.48) (-5.51) (-6.89) (-6.99) (-6.54) (-6.37) 
B/M - 
- 0.011 c - 0.011 c - 0.0092 - 0.0094 c - 0.0131 b - 0.0127 b 
(-1.82) (-1.84) (-1.63) (-1.71) (-2.30) (-2.33) 
Leverage + 
0.0021 a 0.00120 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.004 a 0.003 a 
(5.81) (5.93) (5.03) (5.04) (6.12) (5.47) 
VROE - 
-2.60e-06 b -2.64e-06 b - 0.00008 a - 0.00008 a - 0.00007 a -0.00008 a 
(-2.11) (-2.15) (-2.90) (-2.86) (-3.32) (-3.28) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.025 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.024 0.026 
              (a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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average of -14% to -19% compared to stocks that did not hit the static lower limit. Such a finding 
is in line with hypothesis 3 that idiosyncratic volatility decreases when stocks hit the lower static 
limits. 
Table 7 reports the results of the effect of stocks reaching the dynamic lower limit on the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility.  The coefficients of the independent variable dynamic lower 
through all the different models are negative and statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance. While this evidence provides support to hypothesis 4, it suggests that when stocks  
reach the dynamic lower limit, conditional idiosyncratic volatility decreases by an average of -8% 
to -13% compared to stocks that did not hit the dynamic lower limit. From Tables 6 and 7, we 
conclude that although conditional idiosyncratic volatility decreases as stocks reach static or 
dynamic lower limit, it is even lower when stocks reach the dynamic lower limit by an average 
of -6%. 
To further examine our earlier hypotheses, we compare the limit hit events to the day 
before and after each event to ensure that the impact of limit hit on the idiosyncratic volatility is 
not due to an event from the day before or a continuation of a previous event. Following Ferreira 
and Laux (2007), we estimate the following fixed effect regression model:  
Ψ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏0 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏1 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝑏3 2𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝑏4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏5  (
𝑀
𝐵
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏3 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑏7 𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                   (11) 
Where Ψ𝑖,𝑡 is the log conditional idiosyncratic volatility computed form either model (8) 
or (9), 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the VI dummy associated with conditions (1) to (4), 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 is a dummy 
variable for the day after the limit hit event, 2𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡+2  is a dummy variable for two 
days after the limit hit event, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the firm’s market capitalization, (
𝑀
𝐵
)
𝑖,𝑡
is  the firm book-to-
market ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the firm return on equity ratio, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the firm debt to asset ratio, 
and 𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is volatility on ROE. 
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Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (10). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH 
model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “Dynamic Upper” which is a dummy 
variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (3a), (3b), or (3c) is met and zero otherwise, “ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” 
Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price, “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE volatility In 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 
344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
Expected 
Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
 (1)  
G-IVOL 
 (2) 
E-IVOL 
 (3) 
G-IVOL 
 (4) 
E-IVOL 
 (5) 
G-IVOL 
 (6) 
Dynamic Upper + 
0.94 a 0.94 a 0.98 a 0.98 a 0.98 a 0.97 a 
(100.09) (99.93) (93.57) (91.39) (97.61) (97.47) 
ROE + 
0.20 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.20 a 0.20 a 
(4.01) (4.14) (4.24) (4.35) (4.24) (4.55) 
Size - 
-8.03e-11 a -8.17e-11 a -9.48e-11 a -9.69e-11 a -8.77e-11 a -8.55e-11 a 
(-5.13) (-5.13) (-6.43) (-6.58) (-5.95) (-5.78) 
B/M - 
- 0.012 b - 0.011 b - 0.009 b  - 0.01 b - 0.0132 a - 0.0127 a 
(-2.12) (-2.13) (-202) (-2.20) (-2.91) (-3.01) 
Leverage + 
0.001 a 0.0009 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 
(4.17) (4.06) (5.51) (5.55) (7.58) (6.40) 
VROE - 
-1.67e-06 -1.71e-06 - 0.00008 b - 0.00006 a - 0.00005 b -0.00006 b 
(-1.26) (-1.30) (-2.25) (-2.22) (-2.39) (-2.44) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
No  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.08 0.08 0.087 0.087 0.082 0.085 
(a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10%
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Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (10). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH 
model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “Static Lower” which is a dummy 
variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (2a) or (2b) is met and zero otherwise, “ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” Book-
to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price and “VROE” is ROE volatility. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using 
Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
Expected 
Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
Static Lower - 
- 0.19 c - 0.19 c - 0.15 b - 0.16 b - 0.15 b - 0.14 b 
(-1.88) (-1.92) (-2.21) (-2.28) (-2.37) (-1.96) 
ROE + 
0.19 a 0.20 a 0.21 a 0.22 a 0.14 b 0.20 a 
(3.11) (3.22) (3.51) (3.58) (2.24) (3.62) 
Size - 
-1.01e-10 a -1.02e-10 a -1.21e-10 a -1.24e-10 a -1.51e-09 a -1.11e-10 a 
(-5.42) (-5.46) (-6.88) (-6.97) (-5.02) (-6.40) 
B/M - 
- 0.012 c - 0.012 c - 0.01 - 0.01 c - 0.01 c - 0.01 b 
(-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.62) (-1.70) (-1.89) (-2.25) 
Leverage + 
0.002 a 0.0019 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.032 a 0.003 a 
(5.36) (5.45) (4.80) (4.81) (5.13) (5.23) 
VROE - 
-2.66e-06 b -2.70e-06 b - 0.00008 a - 0.00009 a - 0.00009 a - 0.00008 a 
(-2.18) (-2.22) (-2.95) (-2.92) (-3.43) (-3.36) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.02 0.02 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 
(a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (14). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH 
model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “Dynamic Lower” which is a dummy 
variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (4a), (4b), or (4c) is met and zero otherwise, “ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” 
Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price, “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE volatility In 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 
344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm.  
 
Expected 
Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
 (1) 
G-IVOL 
 (2) 
E-IVOL 
 (3) 
G-IVOL 
 (4) 
E-IVOL 
 (5) 
G-IVOL 
 (6) 
Dynamic Lower - 
- 0.13 a - 0.13 a - 0.09 a - 0.10 a - 0.08 a - 0.09 a 
(-5.29) (-5.37) (-3.28) (-3.36) (-2.95) (-3.43) 
ROE + 
0.19 a 0.20 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.20 a 0.20 a 
(3.06) (3.17) (3.47) (3.55) (3.38) (3.58) 
Size - 
-1.01e-10 a -1.03e-10 a -1.21e-10 a -1.24e-10 a -1.14e-10 a -1.11e-10 a 
(-5.42) (-5.46) (-6.86) (-6.96) (-6.53) (-6.39) 
B/M - 
- 0.012 c - 0.012 c - 0.01 - 0.01 c - 0.01 b - 0.01 b 
(-1.77) (-1.79) (-1.61) (-1.69) (-2.22) (-2.24) 
Leverage + 
0.002 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.004 a 0.003 a 
(5.47) (5.57) (4.83) (4.84) (5.89) (5.26) 
VROE - 
-2.68e-06 b -2.72e-06 b - 0.00009 a - 0.00009 a - 0.00008 a - 0.00008 a 
(-2.19) (-2.23) (-2.96) (-2.92) (-3.43) (-3.36) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.020 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.021 
(a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10%
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Table 8 exhibits the results of equation (11) for the static upper VI case, where we compare the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility on days when limits are reached to one day before the limits 
were reached and two days after the limit events. Table 8 shows that the conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility is around 21% one day prior to reaching the upper limit. However, when stock prices 
reach the static upper limits, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility jumps to an average of 82%, 
an increase of 60% from the day before the static upper limit was reached. Surprisingly, the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility decreases the day after the static upper limit is reached and 
goes back to the same level as the day before the upper limit is reached which is 21%. The 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility continues to drop to an average of 15% two days after reaching 
the static upper limits. Thus, we conclude that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility is higher on 
days when the static upper limits are reached compared to the day before and after, confirming 
hypothesis 6. 
A similar pattern has been observed for the dynamic upper limits. Table 9 illustrates that the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility is around 7% one day before the dynamic upper limits are 
reached but jumps sharply to about 95% on the day the dynamic upper limits are hit. Similar to 
the static upper limits, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility cools off to 7% the day after the 
dynamic limits are reached and continues to decrease to reach 3% two days after the dynamic 
limits are reached. This indicates that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility is higher on days 
when the dynamic upper limits are reached compared to the day before and after, confirming 
hypothesis 7. 
The conditional idiosyncratic volatility one day prior to reaching the static lower limits is very 
similar to that of the static upper limits. Table 10 shows that the conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility is around 26% the day before the static lower limits are reached however, it plummets 
to -37% when the lower static limits are hit. The conditional idiosyncratic volatility reverts back 
to the normal range one and two days after the static lower hits to reach 24% then 19%, 
respectively. These results provide supporting evidence for hypothesis 8 that the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility is lower on days when the static lower limit is reached compared to the 
day before and after.  
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Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (11). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 
4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Static Upper” is a dummy variable that equals one if any of 
the conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event, “2DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for 2 days after the limit hit event, “ROE” firm 
return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price , “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE volatility. In 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Expected Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
DayBeforeDUM + 
0.22 a 0.22 a 0.20 a 0.20 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 
(3.96) (4.02) (3.68) (3.62) (3.73) (3.78) 
Static Upper + 
0.80 a 0.80 a 0.83 a 0.83 a 0.83 a 0.82 a 
(49.37) (49.67) (39.39) (39.38) (38.74) (40.32) 
DayAfterDUM + 
0.18 a 0.18 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.20 a 
(3.71) (3.62) (5.70) (5.61) (5.96) (5.32) 
2DaysAfterDUM + 
0.15 a 0.15 a 0.15 a 0.14 a 0.14 a 0.15 a 
(3.47) (3.61) (4.12) (3.92) (4.04) (4.09) 
ROE + 
0.21 a 0.21 a 0.23 a 0.23 a 0.22 a 0.22 a 
(3.46) (3.58) (3.89) (3.96) (3.83) (4.06) 
Size - 
-9.86e-11 a -1.00e-10 a -1.19e-10 a -1.21e-10 a -1.11e-10 a -1.09e-10 a 
(-5.50) (-5.53) (-6.90) (-7.01) (-6.54) (-6.38) 
B/M - 
- 0.01 c - 0.01 c - 0.01 c - 0.01 c - 0.01 b - 0.01 b 
(-1.86) (-1.87) (-1.66) (-1.74) (-2.34) (-2.36) 
Leverage + 
0.002 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.004 a 0.003 a 
(5.82) (5.94) (5.07) (5.08) (6.19) (5.52) 
VROE - 
-2.58e-06 b -2.62e-06 b - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a 
(-2.09) (-2.13) (-2.98) (-2.94) (-3.49) (-3.42) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.027 
Table 9 reports the results of estimating equation (11). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 
4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Dynamic Upper” is a dummy variable that equals one if any 
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of the conditions in (3a), (3b), or (3c) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event, “2DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for 2 days after the limit hit event, 
“ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price , “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE 
volatility. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Expected Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
1 Day before  
0.07 a 0.07 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 0.07 a 
(6.40) (6.36) (5.75) (5.78) (5.63) (6.36) 
Dynamic Upper + 
0.93 a 0.93 a 0.96 a 0.96 a 0.96 a 0.95 a 
(100.74) (100.84) (93.87) (91.75) (97.30) (97.11) 
1 Day after + 
0.09 a 0.09 a 0.08 a 0.08 a 0.08 a 0.08 a 
(9.79) (9.58) (9.47) (9.35) (8.94) (9.07) 
2 Days after  
0.04 a 0.04 a 0.03 a 0.03 a 0.02 c 0.03 a 
(4.22) (4.09) (2.98) (2.83) (1.74) (2.64) 
ROE + 
0.20 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 0.20 a 0.20 a 
(4.04) (4.17) (4.26) (4.38) (4.26) (4.58) 
Size - 
-7.84e-11 a -7.99e-11 a -9.33e-11 a -9.54e-11 a -8.62e-11 a -8.39e-11 a 
(-5.05) (-5.05) (-6.36) (-6.51) (-6.87) (-5.69) 
B/M - 
- 0.01 b - 0.01 b - 0.01 b - 0.01 b - 0.01 a - 0.01 a 
(-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-2.24) (-2.95) (-3.05) 
Leverage + 
0.001 a 0.001 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 0.002 a 
(3.48) (3.32) (5.43) (5.47) (7.67) (6.38) 
VROE - 
-1.62e-06  -1.66e-06  - 0.0001 b - 0.0001 b - 0.0001 b - 0.0001 b 
(-1.23) (-1.27) (-2.24) (-2.21) (-2.40) (-2.45) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.083 0.083 0.088 0.087 0.082 0.086 
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Table 11 shows the results of the impact of the dynamic lower VI on the conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility. It reveals that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility on the day the dynamic lower 
limits are reached, around -22%, is lower than the day before the dynamic lower limits are hit, 
about 21%. The conditional idiosyncratic volatility reverts to its normal range, around 20% for 
the day after the dynamic lower limits are reached and about 15% for two days after the dynamic 
lower limits are reached. 
4.3. Volatility Interruptions and the Volatility Spill-over Hypotheses: 
 
In this section, we examine the volatility spill-over hypothesis under static and dynamic VI 
mechanism. Kim and Rhee (1997) explain that price limits trigger higher volatility on subsequent 
days of reaching the price limits (volatility spill-over hypothesis). The literature is divided in the 
effectiveness price limits in curbing the volatility spill-over over the following days of hitting the 
limits. This paper provides new evidence on the volatility spill-over hypothesis from the static 
and dynamic VI mechanism. 
We set a range of a two-day window after the limit hits to test for the volatility spill-over 
hypothesis. The conditional idiosyncratic volatility is our measure of volatility from equations (8) 
and (9). In equation (11), we introduce 2𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀 in addition to the 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑈𝑀 to 
observe the transition of volatility after the limits are reached. 
Table 8 shows that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility on the day the static upper limit is 
reached was around 82% but declines to 21% the day after the limit hit, which is the same level 
of volatility the day before the static upper limit was reached. Moreover, the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility continues to decline two days after the static upper limit was reached to 
be 15% on average. This suggests that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility diminishes after a 
stock reached the static upper limits. Such evidence provides support to hypothesis 10. 
Table 9 shows similar results for the dynamic upper limit as the static one. The conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility drops from 95% on the day the dynamic upper limit was reached to 7% 
on the day after and 3% two days after reaching the limit. It is important to emphasize that the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility the day after the dynamic upper hit reached the same level of 
volatility the day before the limit was reached, both at 7%. So, the conditional idiosyncratic  
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Table 10 reports the results of estimating equation (11). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 
4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Static Lower” is a dummy variable that equals one if any of 
the conditions in (2a) or (2b) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event, “2DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for 2 days after the limit hit event, “ROE” firm 
return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price , “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE volatility. In 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Expected Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
1 Day before + 
0.23 a 0.22 a 0.29 a 0.28 a 0.27 a 0.26 a 
(4.87) (4.55) (4.68) (4.57) (4.07) (4.34) 
Static Lower - 
- 0.38 b - 0.39 b - 0.38 a - 0.38 a - 0.34 b - 0.37 a 
(-2.42) (-2.45) (-2.64) (-2.66) (-2.36) (-2.64) 
1 Day after + 
0.25 a 0.25 a 0.22 a 0.22 a 0.25 a 0.24 a 
(7.03) (6.91) (5.85) (5.94) (6.60) (6.49) 
2 Days after + 
0.16 a 0.18 a 0.19 a 0.19 a 0.24 a 0.22 a 
(3.31) (3.92) (4.11) (3.93) (5.06) (5.10) 
ROE + 
0.20 a 0.20 a 0.22 a 0.22 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 
(3.19) (3.30) (3.61) (3.68) (3.53) (3.74) 
Size - 
-1.01e-10 a -1.02e-10 a -1.21e-10 a -1.24e-10 a -1.14e-10 a -1.11e-10 a 
(-5.45) (-5.49) (-6.90) (-7.00) (-6.57) (-6.42) 
B/M - 
- 0.01 c - 0.01 c - 0.01 - 0.01 c - 0.01 b - 0.01 b 
(-1.80) (-1.81) (-1.61) (-1.69) (-2.24) (-2.26) 
Leverage + 
0.002 a 0.002 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.004 a 0.003 a 
(5.71) (5.82) (5.04) (5.05) (6.19) (5.52) 
VROE - 
-2.64e-06 b -2.69e-06 b - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a 
(-2.17) (-2.20) (-2.95) (-2.91) (-3.41) (-3.35) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.020 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.022 
Table 11 reports the results of estimating equation (11). The dependent variable is firm’s conditional idiosyncratic volatility measured using EGARCH and GARCH model from estimating the FF 3-factors model, Carhart 
4-factors model and FF 5-factors model. The independent variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Dynamic Lower” is a dummy variable that equals one if any 
32 
of the conditions in (4a), (4b) or (4c) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event, “2DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for 2 days after the limit hit event, 
“ROE” firm return on equity, “Size” is market capitalization, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price , “Leverage” is firm debt to asset ratio and “VROE” is ROE 
volatility. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Expected Sign 
FF 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors FF 5 Factors 
E-IVOL 
(1) 
G-IVOL 
(2) 
E-IVOL 
(3) 
G-IVOL 
(4) 
E-IVOL 
(5) 
G-IVOL 
(6) 
1 Day before + 
0.20 a 0.21 a 0.22 a 0.23 a 0.21 a 0.21 a 
(17.11) (17.41) (16.98) (17.18) (16.23) (16.99) 
Dynamic Lower - 
- 0.24 a - 0.24 a - 0.21 a - 0.22 a - 0.19 a - 0.21 a 
(-8.45) (-8.49) (-6.34) (-6.36) (-6.15) (-6.61) 
1 Day after + 
0.19 a 0.19 a 0.20 a 0.20 a 0.21 a 0.20 a 
(20.13) (19.83) (17.76) (17.64) (19.30) (19.23) 
2 Days after + 
0.13 a 0.13 a 0.16 a 0.16 a 0.16 a 0.16 a 
(12.48) (12.78) (16.34) (16.27) (14.94) (14.65) 
ROE + 
0.22 a 0.22 a 0.24 a 0.24 a 0.23 a 0.23 a 
(3.60) (3.72) (4.09) (4.16) (4.02) (4.26) 
Size - 
-9.98e-11 a -1.01e-10 a -1.20e-10 a -1.22e-10 a -1.12e-10 a -1.09e-10 a 
(-5.63) (-5.65) (-7.05) (-7.15) (-6.69) (-6.51) 
B/M - 
- 0.01 b - 0.01 b - 0.01 c - 0.01 b - 0.01 b - 0.01 b 
(-2.00) (-2.01) (-1.91) (-2.03) (-2.56) (-2.59) 
Leverage + 
0.001 a 0.001 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 
(3.99) (4.02) (3.89) (3.89) (4.86) (4.26) 
VROE - 
-2.52e-06 b -2.56e-06 b - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a - 0.0001 a 
(-2.15) (-2.19) (-2.78) (-2.74) (-3.13) (-3.12) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N  255,414 255,127 258,710 258,402 258,732 258,992 
Adj R2  0.024 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.026 
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volatility declines after reaching the dynamic upper limits which provides support to hypothesis 
11. 
From tables 8 and 9 we can observe that when a stock reaches the upper static or dynamic 
limits, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases but sharply decreases the day after the 
limit is reached to match the conditional idiosyncratic volatility on the day before the limit was 
reached. Furthermore, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility continues to decline two days after 
the limits, showing no evidence of volatility spill-over. This suggests that the static and dynamic 
VI are in fact effective in curbing the excessive volatility after the limits are reached.  
Table 10 shows that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility was around to -37% on the day the 
static lower limit is reached, then it reverts to 24% on the next day, similar to the level of volatility 
the day before the limit was reached. The conditional idiosyncratic volatility continues to decline 
gradually during two days after the limit hit event to be at 19%. This result provide support to 
hypothesis 12 that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility starts to augment one day after a stock 
reaches the static lower limits and declines during the second day.  
We reach a similar result for the dynamic lower limit as the static lower limit. Table 11 
confirms that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility was around -22% on the day the dynamic 
lower limit is reached but increases the day after to reach 20%, which is the same range as the day 
before the dynamic lower limit is reached. The conditional idiosyncratic volatility drops even 
more two days after the limit is reached to around 15%. Tables 10 and 11 also provide supporting 
evidence for the effectiveness of the static and dynamic VI as there was no evidence of volatility 
spill-over.  
Our results are consistent with the existing body of literature that examines the impact of 
circuit breakers on volatility spill-over. That is, price limits are effective in lowering the volatility 
on days following limit hits ( i.e Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2017) and Brugler, Linton, Noss and 
Pedace (2018) ). We observe similar pattern through the upper and lower static and dynamic 
limits within a two-day window. We witness that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility goes 
back to its normal range one day after the limit is reached. Furthermore, we observe that the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility continues to drop two days after the limit is reached. This 
suggests that the static and dynamic VI are effective in curbing the day to day volatility. 
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5. Conclusion and policy implications:  
 
In this paper, we examine the role of the static and dynamic VI on idiosyncratic volatility and 
test the volatility spill-over hypothesis. We follow Fu (2009) in estimating the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility using EGARCH and GARCH processes. We find that the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility surges when a stock reaches the upper static or dynamic limits and 
declines when it hit the lower static or dynamic limits. We further investigate our hypotheses by 
looking at the conditional idiosyncratic volatility one day before and one day after the limit hit 
event. Our earlier results still hold and show that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility on the 
upper static or dynamic limit hit day is higher than the day before and after. In fact, the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility on the day after the limit hit event reverts to the same level of 
volatility as the day before the event day. Moreover, the conditional idiosyncratic volatility is 
lower on the lower static or dynamic limit hit day than the day before and after.  
In addition, we set a two-day window after the limit hit event to test for the volatility spill-
over hypothesis. Our analysis did not show any evidence of volatility spill-over over the next two 
days of reaching the static and dynamic VI, upper or lower. This indicates that the VI mechanism 
is effective in limiting the impact of extreme volatility.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Stock Return and the Volatility Guards in NASDAQ Stockholm 
 
 
1. Introduction and motivation: 
1.1. Background: 
The objective of market regulators and policymakers is to enhance the efficiency of financial 
markets while preventing markets from a sudden meltdown due to bad news, high frequency 
trading, manipulations, or market panic. For this, regulators continuously impose new rules and 
regulations on financial markets. Following the market crash of October 19, 1987 and in light of 
the Black Monday, a growing number of regulatory reports and academic papers discuss the 
event of the 1987 crash and whether regulations around that time were effective in withstanding 
the shock. They also propose different trading mechanisms to help market regulators improve 
financial markets.  
Circuit breakers were first proposed by former United Stated Treasury Secretary, Nicholas 
Brady, after the 1987 market crash. They were first imposed on the New York Stock Exchange in 
1987 after the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged by 22.6%. The Brady Commission 
(1988) suggests implementing market wide circuit breakers. The report also suggests that trading 
halts should not be triggered frequently, suggesting setting high bounds for circuit breakers. 
Moreover, The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), known as the Miller Report, report that any 
implementation of price limits should be carefully evaluated and should help issues related to 
the first hours of trading4. However, in 1988, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, 
                                                          
4 For more information see:  (1) Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). "Final Report on Stock 
Index Futures and Cash Market Activity during October 1987 to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission." The Division of Economic Analysis and the Division of the Trading and Markets, January 
1988. (2) U.S. General Accounting Office. "Financial Markets: Preliminary Observations on the October 
1987 Crash." Report to the Congressional Requesters, January 1988. (3) Brown, S. and Warner, J. "Using 
Daily Stock Returns."/our/ia/ of Financial Economics 14 (1985), 3-31. Chicago Board of Trade. "The 
Report of the Chicago Board of Trade to the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms." December 
1987. 
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issued a report that was not in favor of any trading halts or price limits mechanisms imposed on 
stock markets. They claim that mechanisms such as different time openings for different financial 
markets are more effective in facing market swings.  
Lehmann (1989) defines circuit breakers as “devices for halting or limiting trading when 
prices move too much.” In general, circuit breakers halts are imposed when a financial asset 
reaches a certain threshold, +/-10% for example, depending on the rules of that specific market. 
Once a halt is triggered, the index or stock in this case cannot be traded for a specific period of 
time (minutes, hours, or even for an entire day) depending on the regulations of the market, to 
allow for the volatility of the halted asset to drop. Thus, circuit breakers can be thought of as some 
temporary pauses on trading a specific financial asset once it reaches a certain threshold. Overall, 
circuit breakers temporarily put the market on hold, for a short period of time, due to a sudden 
surge or downfall to allow for the market to adjust and prevent from a massive collapse. 
Countries such as Japan, France, China, South Korea, and many more followed the United States 
in imposing circuit breakers in their financial markets. 
 
1.2. Development of Circuit Breakers: 
Moser (1990) identifies three types of circuit breakers: order-imbalance circuit breakers, 
volume induced circuit breakers, and price change circuit breakers. Moser explains that “Order-
imbalance circuit breakers are intended to protect the interests of market makers in specialist 
markets. Volume-induced circuit breakers are intended to protect the viability of back-office 
operations. Price-change circuit breakers are intended to bring excessive volatility under control.” 
The 2010 Flash Crash Market questioned the effectiveness of market-wide circuit breakers 
and encouraged regulators to re-engineer circuit breakers to fit specific market characteristics. 
Hence, modified versions of circuit breakers have been introduced in many international financial 
markets. 
Abad and Pascual (2013) point out two main types of circuit breakers: price limits and trading 
halts. They distinguish between two types of price limits, daily price limits and intraday price 
limits. Daily price limits, also known as the order rejection model, are a volatility-stabilizer 
mechanism that puts some upper and lower bounds on trading, curbing the day to day volatility. 
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To explain, regulators set a daily percentage range of trading that is based on previous day’s 
closing price. Thus, stock prices can neither exceed nor go below the price limit bounds, allowing 
the market to stabilize. Once the daily price limits are triggered, trades beyond price limits cannot 
be executed. The intraday price limits, known as volatility guards or volatility interruption (VI 
hereafter), are more sophisticated models of the daily price limits. The VI mechanism combines 
(1) an intraday price limits, known as the dynamic VI, that are based around the last traded 
orderbook price, and (2) daily price limits, known as the static VI, that are based around the last 
auction price, which may have been the price traded in VI from earlier that day, the opening 
auction, or if there was no trade for either of these then the official closing price of the previous 
day. The dynamic VI is triggered when the difference between a stock’s most recent execution 
price and potential execution price exceeds a specified price range, while the static VI is triggered 
when the difference between the price at the previous call auction and the potential execution 
price exceeds specified price range.  Therefore, it is logical for the range of the static VI to be wider 
than the dynamic one. It is important to note that some markets solely adopt dynamic VI. 
Abad and Pascual (2013) also distinguish between two types of trading halts, asset-specific 
trading halts and market-wide trading halts. The market-wide trading halt is a discretionary 
model and trading halts are activated under specific circumstances determined by market 
regulators such as recessions or market turmoil. Unlike the asset-specific trading halts model, 
trading halts in a market-wide model may include all financial instruments or certain securities. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of implementing the static and dynamic 
VI on stock return in Nasdaq Stockholm. Static and dynamic VI were adopted around the same 
time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of static and dynamic 
VI on stock return. In fact, this is the first paper to ever study the relationship between stock 
return and any type of circuit breakers around the world, not only static and dynamic VI, but also 
including price limits and trading halts. Previous studies have examined the impact of VI on price 
discovery, information asymmetry, adverse selection, and market quality, but no study has 
approached VI impact on stock return. 
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As far as our contribution is concerned, this paper contributes to the body of literature in 
many ways. First, this paper enriches the literature on Market Microstructure by providing new 
evidence from NASDAQ OMX Nordic on the impact of the newly-introduced static and dynamic 
VI mechanism on the stock market. The mainstream of papers discussing VI in the market 
microstructure literature focus on their impact on price discovery, market quality, and 
information asymmetry; hence, this paper expands the VI literature by looking from a different 
angle, which is stock return. Second, it also adds value to the price limits and circuit breakers 
literature since VI is one form of price limits as discussed by Abad and Pascual (2013). Third, this 
paper contributes to the asset pricing literature in two distinctive ways. There are two opposing 
views on the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and the cross sectional of stock returns. 
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show that there is a negative relation between lagged 
realized idiosyncratic risk and returns, while Fu (2009) shows a positive relation between 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility estimated using (EGARCH) models and expected stock 
returns. This paper sheds the light on the effect of VI on idiosyncratic volatility. This paper also 
highlights the effect of VI on stock return in the light of the evidence we obtain in Alsunbul (2019) 
and provide supporting evidence to the literature in the relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and return. Finally, this paper contributes to the portfolio management literature by providing 
evidence on situations when the stock return is expected to be high or low in stock markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature 
review, motivation, and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data and methodology 
used in our analysis. Section 4 presents and interprets the results. Section 5 summarizes the 
findings and concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Motivation & Hypotheses Development: 
2.1. Literature Review: 
2.1.1. Literature Review Related to Circuit Breaker and Price Limits: 
The literature in price limits identifies two opposing views. Some claim that price limits 
improve the quality financial of markets while others claim the opposite. Lehmann (1989) argues 
that in markets where price limits are imposed, the imbalance of supply and demand in daily 
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trading causes the prices to reach the limits. Hence, volatility increases in longer horizons, causing 
liquidity to drop. Subrahmanyam (1994) investigates the impact of circuit breakers on market 
volatility. The results suggest that the implementation of circuit breakers causes market volatility 
to surge and therefore, market liquidity to drop. Moreover, Diacogiannis, Patsalis, Tsangarakis, 
and Tsiritakis (2005) examine the impact of imposing price limits on overreactions in Athens 
Stock Exchange and find evidence of short-term overreaction during periods of one-day upper 
limit hit, two-day upper limit hits, three-day upper limit hits, and one-day lower limit hit. 
George and Hwang (1995) select a sample of stocks from the Tokyo stocks exchange to 
examine the volatility of the daily returns based on the opening and closing prices and its relation 
to price limits. They find that for highly traded stocks in Tokyo stocks exchange, volatility is 
higher for opening prices compared to closing prices. This indicates that close-to-close returns are 
higher, because of lower volatility, than open-to-open returns. This finding contradicts with the 
goal of price limit rule, concluding that price limit rule increases volatility. 
Kim and Rhee (1997) study the price limit performance in Tokyo Stock Exchange, beginning 
by examining the claims of support and opposition of the price limit rule. They state that 
advocates of the price limits rule believe that such a device helps reduce stock price volatility, 
does not affect trading movement, and reduces overreaction; while opponents claim that price 
limits cause higher volatility in the long-run (volatility spillover), negatively affect (delay) the 
price discovery process, and since price limits restrict trading, opponents argue that trading 
activity will get affected accordingly. The authors examine both sides of the argument and 
conclude that price limits do not curb volatility for stocks that reach price limits more frequently 
as fast as stocks that do not normally hit the price limit, which is in line with the findings of 
Lehmann (1989) and George and Hwang (1995). They also show that stocks that reach a price 
limit tend to delay price discovery, compared to stocks that do not reach price limits at all. This 
is consistent with Fama (1989) who shows that circuit breakers delay price discovery and increase 
volatility. 
Cho, Russell, Tiao, and Tsay (2002) use high frequency data in their empirical work to 
investigate the magnet effect of price limits in Taiwan Stock Exchange. The magnet effect of price 
limit is the tendency for a stock price to accelerate towards the upper limit as the stock price gets 
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closer to the upper bound. However, the opposite does not hold true. As a matter of fact, stock 
prices tend to move solely toward the lower limit as they get closer to the lower bound. The 
empirical results confirm the existence of the magnet effect, which is caused by the illiquidity risk 
and investors behavior in Taiwan Stock Exchange. To confirm the accuracy of their model in 
capturing the magnet effect, they apply their model on the S&P 500 where the price limit rule 
does not exist. The results show no evidence of the magnet effect. 
Tooma (2011) investigates the existence of the magnet effect of price limits in the Egyptian 
stock exchange for the period from 1997 to 2002, where a 5 percent price limit was imposed. The 
paper uses pooled time series data for two sub-groups of firms; one for a period where a price 
limit was imposed and another when it was not to apply a logit model of probability of hitting 
the 5 percent limit. Results show that the change in the coefficient between periods, when price 
limits were not imposed compared to the period when price limits were imposed, is consistent 
with the magnet effect hypothesis. The coefficient indicates that the magnet effect is higher in the 
period when the price limit was imposed compared to the period when the price limit rule was 
not in effect. In other words, the probability of reaching the price limit has increased after 
imposing the price limit rule, consistent with Cho et al (2002). 
Advocates of the price limit rule, on the other hand, view price limits positively and claim 
that price limits reduce price volatility. They argue that setting daily upper and lower bounds for 
stock prices to move within, helps manage price volatility and gives room for market participants 
to cool off. This prevents investors from initiating a market panic and avoid overreaction. Thus, 
allowing volatility to drop. 
Yang Chu, Ko, and Lee (2018) study the effect of price limits on continuing overreaction and 
momentum in Taiwan Stock Exchange and find that imposing price limits reduce investors 
overreaction. Kim and Yang (2003) investigate whether price limits can play a role in reducing 
overreaction in Taiwan Stock market under two hypotheses: the cooling-off hypothesis and the 
magnet hypothesis. They find that overreaction increases as prices are approaching price limits 
and decreases as prices sequentially hit the price limits. 
Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2017) apply the propensity score matching techniques to narrow 
the sample selection bias in Kim and Rhee (1997). They show that price limits are effective in 
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reducing the transitory volatility in days after price limits are hit. Moreover, they find no evidence 
of the volatility spill-over. These finding contradict with those of Kim and Rhee (1997).   
Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) investigate the effectiveness of price limits in the U.S. future market 
for four commodities: corn, silver, treasury bonds, and soybeans. The results indicate that price 
limits can be used as a device to monitor price movement and volatility in volatile markets. Ma 
et al (1989) point out three benefits for imposing price limits. First of all, price limits can be used 
to attenuate credit risk. Second, price limits can serve as a tool to prevent the market from 
overreacting in response to news. Third, price limits can be used to prove that markets are not as 
liquid. 
Kim and Park (2010) introduce a manipulation-based model to test reasons behind the 
adoption of price limits in stock markets. Their model shows that imposing the price limit rule 
discourages market manipulation. They also argue that a possible reason, based om their model, 
for market regulators to impose price limit rules is that the level of manipulation is high. They go 
on to modify their model to estimate price limits levels and conclude that markets with high levels 
of corruption and low public enforcement tend to have high price limits. 
Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2010) investigate whether or not price limits are bad for equity 
markets. They notice the growing literature criticizing price limits and decide to test it themselves. 
To do so, they gathere a sample of 58 stock markets, which represents about 80% of the world’s 
equity markets. Surprisingly, about 71 percent, 41 equity markets, out of the sample impose the 
price limits rule.  They find that markets that impose price limits are characterized by low levels 
of legal and technical development, less transparency, higher corruption levels, and lower 
business disclosure. These findings are consistent with their hypothesis even after the robust 
check.  
2.1.2 Literature Review Related to Volatility Interruptions: 
Due to the novelty of VI, four papers have discussed the new mechanism. Kwon, Eom, 
La, and Park (2018) examine the effect of introducing the static and dynamic VI to the pre-existing 
price limits in the Korean Stock Market. They find that the static VI has a weak impact in 
stabilizing price discovery, while the dynamic VI has a positive effect in stabilizing price 
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discovery. They also find that static IV has a limited effect as it provides similar results as the 
existing price limits system.  
Brugler and Linton (2014) study the role of static VI on market quality in London Stock 
Exchange. They argue that market quality worsens after a long suspension from lower static VI 
events. Nevertheless, they document that lower static VI helps in interrupting poor market 
quality to other stocks at times when the market is at distress. Finally, they show that upper static 
VI causes excessive trading spill-overs. 
Zimmermann (2013) examine the impact of VI on price discovery in Deutsche Börse Xetra. 
The study shows that “volatility interruptions contribute to about 36 percent of pre-interruption 
price uncertainty revelation.” The paper also claims that when VIs offers an accurate direction of 
price discovery, subsequent volatility drops. Lastly, the paper documents that although market 
quality improves after an VI is triggered, market traders continue to be alert and watchful.  
Abad and Pascual (2010) observe the impact of the static VI on the Spanish Stock Exchange. 
They document a surge in information asymmetry risk prior to a VI halt, hypothesizing that 
informed traders anticipate their trading strategies arounds VI halts; concluding that VI increases 
information asymmetry. Finally, the authors conclude that high levels of volatility, illiquidity and 
trading activities will remain in the market even after the introduction of the static VI mechanism.    
 
2.1.2. Motivation and Hypotheses Development  
After the 2010 flash crash, many European exchanges announced the introduction of a new 
trading mechanism aiming to reduce market volatility. On June 14, 2010, about one month after 
the flash crash, the Euronext introduced the Static VI, in addition to the pre-existing dynamic VI, 
to all its exchanges in Amsterdam, London, Paris, Lisbon, Brussels, and Dublin. Three months 
later, on September 30, 2010, NASDAQ OMX Nordic introduces an updated VI to its Nordic 
markets to protect investors and listed companies form excess volatility. Nordic markets include 
Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Iceland exchanges. 
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Similar to European exchanges, Asian exchanges followed suit. On September 1, 2014, The 
Korean Stock Exchange introduced the dynamic VI and on June 15, 2015, they announced the 
introduction of the static VI.  
 In this paper, we only focus on one type of circuit breaker, the VI mechanism, both static and 
dynamic. We examine the impact of VI on idiosyncratic volatility in Stockholm stock exchange. 
We chose Stockholm stock exchange for two main reasons. First, Stockholm stock exchange is the 
largest market in Nasdaq OMX Nordic and is the fact that it is managed by Nasdaq implies that 
the level is efficiency is much higher compared to those locally-managed in other European 
markets. Second, it adopts the VI mechanisms, both static and dynamic. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of VI on stock return.  
The early work of Merton (1987) suggests that firm’s idiosyncratic risk is priced due to the 
imperfect diversification. He argues that investors who cannot hold a market portfolio should be 
rewarded. Thus, firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility should offer a return premium to 
compensate investors for the undiversified risk they create, indicating a positive relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and expected return. Malkiel and Xu (2002) find similar results. 
Moreover, Spiegel and Wang (2005) examine the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and 
liquidity and find that expected return increases as idiosyncratic volatility increases. In addition, 
Fu (2009) find a significantly positive relationship between the conditional idiosyncratic volatility 
and expected return. Chau, Goh, and Zhang (2010) find similar results.  
In the previous paper, we have shown that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases 
when stocks reach the upper static or dynamic upper limit. Therefore, and based on the previous 
papers we just reviewed, it is logical to observe a positive stock return when stock prices hit the 
upper static or dynamic limits. Thus, we expect stock return to increase as stock prices approach 
upper static and dynamic limits:  
H1: Stock return increases when stocks hit the upper static limit. 
H2: Stock return increases when stocks hit the upper dynamic limit. 
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On the other hand, we also expect the opposite to hold true which leads us to investigate the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H3: Stock return decreases when stocks hit the lower static limits. 
      H4: Stock return decreases when stocks hit the lower dynamic limits. 
 
To further investigate hypotheses 1 and 2, we look at stock return one day before and day 
after the limit hit day for both upper static and dynamic. We expect our earlier hypotheses to 
hold. That is, stock return is higher on the upper limit hit day compared to the day before and the 
day after the limit hit. We test the following hypotheses:   
 
H5: Stock return is higher on days when the static upper limit is reached compared to the day 
before and after.  
H6: Stock return is higher on days when the dynamic upper limit is reached compared to the day 
before and after. 
 
Similarly, we further investigate hypotheses 3 and 4 and test the following hypotheses: 
 
H7: Stock return is lower on days when the static lower limit is reached compared to the day 
before and after.  
 
H8: Stock return is lower on days when the dynamic lower limit is reached compared to the day 
before and after. 
 
Furthermore, Chang and Dong (2006) point out that large firms tend to have lower 
idiosyncratic volatility, and Fu (2009) shows that “Small firms tend to have higher idiosyncratic 
volatilities than larger firms.” This motivates us to investigate the impact of stock size on the 
relation between stock return and static and dynamic VI. Higher idiosyncratic volatility is only 
observed within the upper limits, while low idiosyncratic volatility is observed within the lower 
bounds. For this reason, we only focus on the static and dynamic upper limits. So, we sort stocks 
by their size and create two portfolios, large market cap and small market cap. Since small stocks 
tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatility than larger stocks, then we expect smaller stocks to 
have higher returns than larger stocks:  
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H9: Small market cap stocks that hit the upper static limit tend to have higher stock returns than 
larger market cap stocks. 
 
H10: Small market cap stocks that hit the upper dynamic limit tend to have higher stock returns 
than larger market cap stocks. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology:  
We obtain daily stock prices and related financial data from DATASTREAM. Data for 
Stockholm spans from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. We chose September 30, 2010 to 
be the starting date for our sample because this is the date when static and dynamic VI first came 
into effect. There are 378 stocks traded in Stockholm Stock Exchange. We drop stocks that were 
listed after December 29, 2017 or have observations less than one week. The final sample consists 
of 344 firms.  The table below summarizes the static and dynamic VI range in Nasdaq Stockholm: 
Exchange 
Static 
Limit 
(stock) 
Static 
Limit 
(Index) 
Dynamic 
Limit (stock) 
Dynamic 
Limit (Index) 
Suspension 
time for 
static 
Suspension 
time for 
dynamic 
Stockholm  
+/- 15% 
from 
opening  
+/- 10% 
from 
opening 
+/- 5% from 
the last 
traded price 
+/- 3% from 
the last 
traded price 
3 minutes 1 minute 
 
To identify static and dynamic limit hit occurrences, we follow these steps. We assume upper 
static limits are reached when any of the following conditions occur: 
 
Ht ≥ Ot + Static limit (15%)                                           (1a) 
                                   Ct ≥ Ot + Static limit (15%)                                                (1b)                                                           
where Ht and Ct  represent Day t’s high and close price, respectively, and Ot  represents Day t’s 
open price.  
We assume Lower static limits are reached when any of the following conditions occur: 
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          Ct ≤ Ot - Static limit (15%)                                              (2a) 
          Lt ≤ Ot - Static limit (15%)                                               (2b) 
   where Lt represent Day t’s low and price 
Similarly, we assume upper dynamic limits are reached when any of the following conditions are 
met: 
                                 Ht ≥ Ot + Dynamic limit (5%)                                       (3a) 
                                Ct ≥ Ot + Dynamic limit (5%)                                        (3b) 
                                Ct ≥ Ht + Dynamic limit (5%)                                         (3c) 
And Lower dynamic limits are reached when any of the following conditions are met: 
                                  Lt ≤ Ot - Dynamic limit (5%)                                       (4a)    
                                  Ct ≤ Ot - Dynamic limit (5%)                                       (4b) 
                                 Ct ≤ Lt - Dynamic limit (5%)                                         (4c) 
Once we determine the number of upper and lower hits from static and dynamic VI, we 
study the impact of static and dynamic VI on stock return. Following Chua, Goh, and Zhang 
(2010), we estimate the following regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
(12) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the logarithmic return, 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀 is the VI dummy associated with 
conditions (1) to (4), and we control for size, book-to-market, and lagged return to control for the 
momentum effect. We extend their work to control for volatility, illiquidity, and return on equity.  
 
 
 
To examine hypotheses 5 to 8, to estimate the following regression: 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑎2 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
               𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +   𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                 (13) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the day before the limit hits 
and zero otherwise and  𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡+1 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the day after the 
limit hits and zero otherwise.  
It is important to point out that panel data settings might suffer from inflated t-statistics 
which could possibly lead to inaccurate inferences and conclusions. For this, we follow Rogers’ 
(1983, 1993) method to correct for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, or contemporaneous 
cross-sectional correlations of error terms by adjusting standard errors for clustering at the firm 
level. In addition to clustering the standard error, we include a year fixed effect dummy for each 
year in the sample to control for any economic changes as suggested by and Lins et al (2017).    
 
4. Results and Interpretations:  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of 344 stocks in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period 
from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. The minimum stock return is -2.28% and the 
maximum is 2.32% with an average of -0.0016% stock return. We do not observe high spikes in 
stock return and this is due to the VI mechanism that restricts stocks from increasing or 
decreasing above or below certain range. Stocks liquidity is relatively higher in Nasdaq 
Stockholm as indicated by the Amihud (2002) measure with a mean of -12.40. Moreover, stock 
volatility is considerably low with an average of 0.02%. As far as stock profitability is concerned, 
the average return on equity is 9.37% and the median is 11.67% indicating that stocks in Nasdaq 
Stockholm are profitable. The average book to market ratio is 61.52%. Hence, stocks in Nasdaq 
Stockholm are characterized by being profitable, liquid, and having low level of volatility for the 
period following the imposition of the VI mechanism from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 
2017. 
Table 2 shows the VI occurrences for both static and dynamic limits sorted by year, market 
capitalization, and market sector. In total, 59,445 times the VI were triggered from September 30, 
2010 to December 29, 2017. Static limits were reached 3,618 times (2,252 static upper hits and 1,366 
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static lower hits) compared with 55,827 for dynamic limits (27,259 and 28,568 limits hit for 
dynamic upper and lower limits, respectively). It is not surprising to observe greater dynamic VI 
occurrences than static because of the limit range. It is common to observe a stock reaching 5% 
from opening price but not common to observe a stock reaching 15% from yesterday’s closing 
price, and this explains why we have more dynamic occurrences compared to their static 
counterparts. 
The year following the implementation of the VI rules, 2011, witnessed the highest VI 
occurrences with a total of 10,501 limit reaches. Out of the 10,501 hits, 288 static upper hits, 228 
static lower hits, 4,234 dynamic upper hits, and 5,751 dynamic lower hits. Moreover, small market 
cap stocks witnessed the highest VI occurrences with 30,882 compared with 8,173 and 20,390 for 
large and medium market cap stocks, respectively. It can be observed here that small market cap 
stocks are more volatile compared to large and medium market cap stocks. Moreover, medium 
market cap stocks are more volatile than larger market cap stocks. This is consistent with the 
literature that small size firms tend to be more volatile compared to their larger counterparts. Fu 
(2008) shows that “Small firms tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatilities than larger firms.”5 
Furthermore, we sort stocks by their market sectors. Nasdaq Stockholm is divided into ten main 
sectors: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, 
Industrials, Oil and Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. Industrials and Health 
care sector observed the highest VI occurrences with 13,549 and Conversely, Utilities and 
Telecommunications sectors witnessed the lowest VI occurrences with 533 and 639 limit hits, 
respectively. 
4.2. Stock return and Volatility Interruptions: 
 
In this section, we report the results of examining the impact of static and dynamic limit hits 
on stock returns.  We estimate equation (12) for static upper and lower limits as well as dynamic 
upper and lower limits. We execute this view by regressing return on the upper and lower limits 
and other control variables. The first column in each regression includes control variables 
suggested by Chua, Goh, and Zhang (2010).  It is well documented that volatility (i.e. Chua, Goh, 
                                                          
5 See also Duffee (1995) for more information. 
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Table 12: Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. 
“Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares in issue, 
“B/M” Book – to - Market,” Leverage”  Total liabilities to total assets ratio, “ROE” Net income over the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities, “ILLIQ” stock daily Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity,  “Closing price” stock daily closing price,  “Daily returns” stock daily return,  
“Volatility” daily return simple volatility. “Lagged Return” is one day lagged return. 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min 
  
Max 
 
Closing price 79.28 52.05 94.20 0.02 1,767.17 
Daily returns - 0.0016% 0.00% 1.38% -2.28% 2.32% 
Volatility 0.071% 0.0091% 1.37% 0.0% 858.63% 
Lagged Return -0.003% 11.67% 1.39% -2.25% 2.35% 
ILLIQ -12.402 -12.19 3.09 -22.58 2.21 
ROE 9.37% 11.67% 13.24% -18.63% 26.50% 
B/M 61.52% 50.44% 40.35% 14.04% 138.45% 
Size 8.9 2.4 13.4 0.21 42.3 
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Table 13 “Volatility Interruptions Occurrences”: This table shows the volatility interruptions occurrences 
categorized by Static and Dynamic hits for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm during the period from 
September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017. 
Panel A: VI occurrences by year 
Year Static Upper Static Lower Dynamic Upper Dynamic Lower 
Occurrences 
Per Year 
2010 64 52 718 670 1,504 
2011 288 228 4,234 5,751 10,501 
2012 314 215 3,369 3,972 7,870 
2013 361 169 3,305 3,145 6,980 
2014 295 193 3,255 3,380 7,123 
2015 330 194 4,479 4,204 9,207 
2016 335 177 4,519 4,527 9,558 
2017 265 138 3,380 2,919 6,702 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
 
Panel B: VI occurrences by Market Capitalization: 
Size Static Upper Static Lower Dynamic Upper Dynamic Lower 
Occurrences 
MC 
Large Cap 118 82 3,987 3,986 8,173 
Medium Cap 641 325 9,987 9,437 20,390 
Small Cap 1,493 959 13,285 15,145 30,882 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
 
Panel C: VI occurrences by Sectors: 
Sector Static Upper Static Lower 
Dynamic 
Upper 
Dynamic 
Lower 
Occurrences 
Sector 
Basic Materials 114 56 1,915 1,787 3,872 
Consumer Goods 133 75 2,271 2,342 4,821 
Consumer Services 163 95 2,560 2,515 5,333 
Financials 227 130 3,024 3,374 6,755 
Health Care 602 310 5,985 6,474 13,371 
Industrials 387 248 6,288 6,626 13,549 
Oil & Gas 30 16 620 530 1,196 
Technology 558 423 4,058 4,334 9,373 
Telecommunications 8 5 274 352 639 
Utilities 30 8 264 234 533 
Total No. of 
Occurrences 
2,252 1,366 27,259 28,568 59,445 
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and Zhang (2010)), illiquidity (i.e. Amihud (2002) and Amihud et al (2015)) and return on equity 
impact return, so we extend the control variables by Chua, Goh, and Zhang (2010) to control for 
these variables. In the second column we include the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) in 
addition to other control variables in the first column, which is calculated as the ratio of the 
absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock: 
                       𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =
|𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡
                                                           (14) 
Where Ri,t is the return for stock i in day t, and VOi,t is the daily trading volume for stock i in day 
t, and CPi,t is the daily closing price for stock i in day t.   
In columns 3 and 4 we include volatility and return on equity, respectively. Here, we 
proxy simple volatility for volatility. Table 14 reports the results from estimating equation 12.  
The coefficient of static upper in the first column is 0.14 and is statistically significant at 1% level 
of significance.  Even after controlling for illiquidity in column 2, volatility in column 3, and ROE 
in column 4, the coefficient is consistent at 0.15 and statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance. This indicates that return increases by an average of 15% when a stock reaches the 
static upper limit compared to a stock that did not reach the static upper limit. This provides 
confirmation for our first hypothesis that stock return increases as the stock reaches the static 
upper limit. 
Table 15 reaches the same conclusion as in Table 14. The coefficients of dynamic upper 
limit in all four models are 6% and statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This 
indicates that stock return on average increases by 6% when stocks reach the dynamic upper limit, 
supporting our second hypothesis. Furthermore, we can conclude that although stock return is 
positive whenever it reaches the upper bound, whether static or dynamic, stock return is even 
higher when it hits the static upper bound than when it hits the dynamic upper bound by about 
8% to 9%, on average. One reason to explain such a phenomenon could be attributed to their level 
of idiosyncratic volatility. Recall that Spiegel and Wang (2005) and Fu (2009) show that stock 
return increases as the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases. Since we have previously 
provided supporting evidence that conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases when stocks 
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reach the upper static or dynamic upper limit, then it is expected to observe an increase in stock 
return for both upper limits, static and dynamic. 
Table 16 presents the results of regressing stock return on the static lower limit dummy 
and other control variables. In all four models, static lower is negatively significant at 1% level of 
significance. The coefficient in the first column is -0.14 and when we add illiquidity to other 
control variables, the coefficient becomes -0.16.  However, no significant change is observed for 
the coefficient of static lower when we include volatility and ROE to other control variables in 
columns 3 and 4, it remains the same at -0.18. Hence, we can conclude that stock return decreases 
when stocks reach the static lower limit by an average of -14% to -18% compared to those that did 
not reach the static lower bound, confirming our third hypothesis.   
Table 17 reports the results of examining the impact of stocks reaching the dynamic lower 
limit on stock return. The coefficients of dynamic lower are -0.05 across all four models and are 
negatively significant at 1% level of significance.  This indicates that stock return decreases by an 
average of 5% when stocks reach the lower dynamic limit, confirming our fourth hypothesis.   
Form Tables 16 and 17, we conclude that whenever stocks reach the lower bound, static 
or dynamic, stock return decreases. Another point worth noting is that static limits, upper or 
lower, have a greater impact on stock returns compared to dynamic limits, upper or lower. We 
have shown from tables 3 and 4 that stock return increases by an average of 14% to 15% when 
stocks hit the upper static limits compared to an average of 6% when they reach the dynamic 
upper limit. Similarly, stocks reaching the static lower limits observe a greater return loss 
compared to stocks reaching the dynamic lower bound. Hence, stocks that frequently hit the static 
limits, upper or lower, are riskier than those that frequently hit the dynamic lower limit. This can 
be attributed to the fact that static limits have a wider VI range of 15% compared to a 5% dynamic 
limits rage. With a wider range, stocks accumulate higher levels of volatility before they reach the 
limits compared to tighter range. In this case, investors need to be compensated for holding such 
volatile stocks and this explains the greater impact of static limits on stock return compared to 
dynamic limits. 
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Table 14 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent 
variables are “Static Upper” which us a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and 
zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is 
the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares 
in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the 
Krona traded volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses are 
t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to 
December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
Static Upper 
0.14 a 0.15 a 0.15 a 0.15 a 
(46.54) (18.48) (18.18) (18.17) 
B/M 
- 0.0008 b - 0.0008 b - 0.0008 b - 0.0008 b 
(-2.15) (-2.22) (-2.33) (-2.25) 
Size 
7.17e-09 a 7.09e-09 a 7.67e-09 a 7.62e-09 a 
(3.05) (3.15) (3.29) (3.72) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.07 a - 0.09 a - 0.09 a - 0.09 a 
(-8.35) (-6.52) (-6.59) (-6.60) 
ILLIQ 
 - 0.0003 a - 0.0006 a - 0.0006 a 
 (-4.57) (-9.83) (-9.41) 
VOL 
  3.48 a 3.44 a 
  (8.69) (8.57) 
ROE 
   0.006 a 
   (6.40) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered 
by 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 13.26% 14.41% 14.59% 14.62% 
                                  (a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10%
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Table 15 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent variables are “Dynamic Upper” which 
is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (3a), (3b) or (3c) is met and zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value 
per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary 
shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, 
“VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. 
The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
Dynamic Upper 
0.06 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 
(46.55) (33.81) (36.69) (36.68) 
B/M 
- 0.0008 c - 0.0009 b - 0.0009 b - 0.0008 b 
(-1.94) (-2.15) (-2.17) (-2.10) 
Size 
1.18e-08 a 9.81e-09 a 9.75e-09 a 9.72e-09 a 
(2.75) (3.11) (3.04) (3.49) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.07 a - 0.08 a - 0.09 a - 0.09 a 
(-5.81) (-5.25) (-5.86) (-5.87) 
Illiquidity 
 - 0.0007 a - 0.0009 a - 0.0008 a 
 (-9.67) (-9.37) (-9.22) 
VOL 
  0.49 a 0.49 a 
  (5.33) (5.33) 
ROE 
   0.006 a 
   (5.93) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 22.49% 24.11% 25.89% 25.92% 
               a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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We further investigate hypotheses one to four by looking at stock return one day before 
and after limit hits. Table 18 shows the results of estimating equation 13 for the static upper limit. 
Through all four models, stock return increases when it reaches the static upper limit by an 
average of 15% but decreases the day before and after the static upper limit hit by an average of 
1%. This result is consistent with our earlier findings and provide support to our fifth hypothesis 
that stock return is higher on days when the static upper limit is reached compared to the day 
before and after. 
Table 19 reports the results of estimating equation 13 for the dynamic upper limit, which 
proves our sixth hypothesis that stock return is higher on days when the dynamic upper limit is 
reached compared to the day before and after. As predicated, stock return increases by 6% when 
it reaches the dynamic upper limit but drops by 1% the day before the limit hit and an average of 
0.1% the day after the limit hit event.  
Our results for the upper limits, both static and dynamic, suggest that stock return surges 
when it hits the upper limits. This should not be surprising since we know that the conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility increases when stocks reach the upper limits as well. These results are 
consistent with Fu (2009) who shows a positive relation between conditional idiosyncratic 
volatility estimated using (EGARCH) models and expected stock returns. 
We have previously shown that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility decreases when a 
stock price reaches the lower bounds, static or dynamic. Since Fu (2009) establishes a positive 
relationship between the conditional idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock returns, we 
should observe a stock return loss when a stock price reaches the lower bounds. 
Table 20 reports the results of estimating equation 13 for the static lower limit. Stock return 
still makes an average loss of - 17% when it reaches the static lower limit, even after comparing 
the return to the day before and after the limit hit day. This evidence provides support to our 
earlier finding from hypothesis three and offers a support to hypothesis seven which argues that  
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Table 16 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent variables are “Static Lower” which is a 
dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (2a) or (2b) is met and zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share 
relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares 
in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, 
“VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. 
The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
Static Lower 
- 0.14 a - 0.16 a - 0.18 a - 0.18 a 
(-17.77) (-14.34) (-20.33) (-20.31) 
B/M 
- 0.0008 b - 0.0008 b - 0.0008 b - 0.0007 b 
(-2.24) (-2.29) (-2.45) (-2.38) 
Size 
7.73e-09 a 9.12e-09 a 9.21e-09 a 9.18e-09 a 
(3.61) (3.98) (4.42) (4.88) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.05 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a 
(-5.15) (-4.71) (-6.41) (-6.42) 
Illiquidity 
 - 0.0001 - 0.0003 a - 0.0003 a 
 (-1.21) (-6.37) (-5.82) 
VOL 
  0.93 a 0.93 a 
  (7.44) (7.45) 
ROE 
   0.005 a 
   (5.92) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 7.38% 8.75% 14.94% 14.96% 
a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 17 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent variables are “Dynamic Lower” which 
is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (4a), (4b) or (4c) is met and zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value 
per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary 
shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, 
“VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. 
The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
Dynamic Lower 
- 0.05 a - 0.05 a - 0.05 a - 0.05 a 
(-40.63) (-28.80) (-34.22) (-34.25) 
B/M 
- 0.0005 b - 0.0006 b - 0.0005 b - 0.0005 b 
(-2.17) (-2.07) (-2.23) (-2.15) 
Size 
6.53e-09 a 9.76e-09 a 9.80e-09 a 9.76e-09 a 
(3.28) (3.90) (4.09) (4.32) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.05 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a 
(-4.59) (-4.15) (-5.36) (-5.36) 
Illiquidity 
 0.0002 a 0.00001 0.00003 
 (2.70) (0.2) (0.5) 
VOL 
  0.83 a 0.83 a 
  (7.08) (7.08) 
ROE 
   0.004 a 
   (5.05) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 14.86% 16.42% 21.51% 21.53% 
            a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10%
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stock return is lower on days when the static lower limit is reached compared to the day before 
and after. 
The results from Table 21 for the dynamic lower limit are similar to those of Table 20 for 
the static lower limit. The results suggest that stock return experience an average of – 5% loss 
when it hits the dynamic lower limit, in all four models, even after controlling for the day before 
in which a stock gains an average of 1% return and the day after where a stock gains 0.3% return. 
Our findings here are the same as our previous findings from hypothesis four and offer support 
to hypothesis eight. 
4.4.Market Capitalization and Volatility Interruptions: 
 
In this section, we investigate whether stock size plays a role in the impact of static and 
dynamic VI on stock return. This hypothesis is motivated by the body of literature that studies 
the relationship between stock market cap and idiosyncratic volatility.  Chang and Dong (2006) 
point out that large firms tend to have lower idiosyncratic volatility, and Fu (2008) shows that 
“Small firms tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatilities than large firms.” So, these two papers 
show a negative relationship between stock market cap and idiosyncratic volatility. Fu (2009) also 
show a positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock return. Hence, 
from these papers, it can be argued that if small firms tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatilities 
than large firms and that there is a positive relationship between expected stock return and the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility, it is logical to assume that small stocks enjoy higher stock 
returns, because of their higher conditional idiosyncratic volatility, than large stocks. In other 
words, since small stocks tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatility than large stocks, then we 
expect small stocks to have higher return than larger stocks. 
This motivates us to investigate the role of firm size on the relation between stock return and 
static and dynamic VI. High idiosyncratic volatility is only observed within the upper limits, 
while low idiosyncratic volatility is observed within the lower bounds. For this reason, we only 
focus on the static and dynamic upper limits. So, we sort stocks by their size and create two 
portfolios, large market cap and small market cap. Then we estimate equation 5 for the two 
portfolios.  
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Table 18 reports the results of estimating equation (13). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The 
independent variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Static 
Upper” which us a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and zero otherwise, 
“DayAfterDUM” is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as 
the book value per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” 
calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each 
stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated 
using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 
2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
DayBeforDUM 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(-1.24) (-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.09) 
Static Upper 
0.15 a 0.16 a 0.15 a 0.15 a 
(42.36) (18.19) (17.70) (17.69) 
DayAfterDUM 
-0.01 a -0.01 b -0.01 a -0.01 a 
(-3.77) (-2.44) (-2.82) (-2.78) 
B/M 
- 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b 
(-2.17) (-2.24) (-2.36) (-2.28) 
Size 
7.15e-09 a 7.07e-09 a 7.67e-09 a 7.62e-09 a 
(3.12) (3.22) (3.36) (3.79) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.06 a - 0.08 a - 0.08 a - 0.08 a 
(-8.24) (-6.02) (-5.99) (-6.00) 
Illiquidity 
 - 0.0003 a - 0.001 a - 0.001 a 
 (-4.86) (-10.49) (-10.05) 
VOL 
  3.60 a 3.56 a 
  (9.43) (9.31) 
ROE 
   0.006 a 
   (6.50) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered 
by 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 13.41% 14.47% 14.66% 14.69% 
            a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 19 reports the results of estimating equation (13). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent 
variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Dynamic Upper” which 
us a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (3a) (3b) or (3c) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” 
is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share 
relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price 
times the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the 
absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm 
return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample 
period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
DayBeforeDU
M 
-0.01 a -0.01 a -0.01 a -0.01 a 
(-5.09) (-5.38) (-5.77) (-5.77) 
Dynamic Upper 
0.06 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 0.06 a 
(44.55) (34.01) (36.62) (36.61) 
DayAfterDUM 
-0.002 c -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-1.91) (-0.92) (-1.28) (-1.26) 
B/M 
- 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b 
(-1.97) (-2.20) (-2.23) (-2.15) 
Size 
1.09e-08 a 8.98e-09 a 8.81e-09 a 8.78e-09 a 
(2.80) (3.18) (3.09) (3.55) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.06 a - 0.08 a - 0.08 a - 0.08 a 
(-4.23) (-3.95) (-4.41) (-4.43) 
Illiquidity 
 - 0.001 a - 0.001 a - 0.001 a 
 (-10.37) (-9.99) (-9.84) 
VOL 
  0.51 a 0.51 a 
  (5.44) (5.45) 
ROE 
   0.01 a 
   (6.14) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered 
by 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 22.81% 24.38% 26.23% 26.26% 
a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10%     
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Table 20 reports the results of estimating equation (13). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent 
variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Static Lower” which us a 
dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (2a) or (2b) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” is a 
dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share relative 
to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price times 
the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute 
daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on 
equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is 
from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
DayBeforeDU
M 
0.05 a 0.05 a 0.03 c 0.03 c 
(2.85) (2.76) (1.91) (1.92) 
Static Lower 
- 0.14 a - 0.17 a - 0.18 a - 0.18 a 
(-25.62) (-14.89) (-20.96) (-20.94) 
DayAfterDUM 
0.01 b 0.001  -0.005  -0.005  
(2.45) (0.46) (-1.56) (-1.54) 
B/M 
- 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.001 b 
(-2.25) (-2.31) (-2.47) (-2.40) 
Size 
7.43e-09 a 8.86e-09 a 9.06e-09 a 9.03e-09 a 
(3.54) (3.92) (4.34) (4.83) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.05 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a - 0.07 a 
(-5.08) (-4.73) (-6.26) (-6.26) 
Illiquidity 
 - 0.0001 - 0.0003 a - 0.0003 a 
 (-1.36) (-6.48) (-5.92) 
VOL 
  0.91 a 0.91 a 
  (6.92) (6.92) 
ROE 
   0.01 a 
   (6.22) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered 
by 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 8.18% 9.32% 15.16% 15.18% 
              a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 21 reports the results of estimating equation (13). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. The independent 
variables are “DayBeforeDUM” which is a dummy variable for the day before the limit hit event, “Dynamic Lower” which 
us a dummy variable that equals one if any of the conditions in (4a), (4b) or (4c) is met and zero otherwise, “DayAfterDUM” 
is a dummy variable for the day after the limit hit event “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share 
relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” calculated as the stock closing price 
times the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the 
absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm 
return on equity. In parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample 
period is from September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm 
. 
 Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) Log (Return) 
DayBeforeDU
M 
0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 
(5.98) (6.16) (5.14) (5.15) 
Dynamic Lower 
- 0.05 a - 0.05 a - 0.05 a - 0.05 a 
(-37.34) (-28.69) (-33.23) (-33.26) 
DayAfterDUM 
0.004 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 0.003 a 
(5.27) (3.54) (3.62) (3.65) 
B/M 
- 0.001 b - 0.001 b - 0.0005 b - 0.0005 b 
(-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.29) (-2.21) 
Size 
6.06e-09 a 9.35e-09 a 9.45e-09 a 9.41e-09 a 
(3.44) (3.99) (4.17) (4.51) 
Lagged Return 
- 0.04 a - 0.06 a - 0.06 a - 0.06 a 
(-3.18) (-3.) (-4.09) (-4.09) 
Illiquidity 
 0.0002 a - 2.98e-06 0.00002 
 (2.65) (-0.05) (0.32) 
VOL 
  0.82 a 0.82 a 
  (7.07) (7.07) 
ROE 
   0.004 a 
   (4.80) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered 
by 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 425,692 358,233 358,233 358,171 
Adj R2 15.59% 17.12% 22.01% 22.03% 
              a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 22 reports the estimation of equation 12 for large and small market cap stocks reaching 
the static upper limit. We find that large stocks gain 14% return when they reach the static upper 
limit, while small stocks gain 16% return. Table 23 reports the estimation of equation 12 for large 
and small market cap stocks reaching the dynamic upper limit. We find that large stocks gain 
0.56% return while small stocks gain 0.71% return as they reach the dynamic upper limit. 
 Hence, these findings indicate that small stocks tend to gain higher return greater than large 
stock as they reach the upper limits, static or dynamic. These results, which are statistically 
significant at 1% significance level, provide support to our hypotheses nine and ten. 
5. Conclusion: 
 
This paper studies the impact of the static and dynamic VI on stock return. Motived by Fu 
(2009) and Chang and Dong (2006) as well as our previous findings, we find that stocks that reach 
the upper static or dynamic limits experience a gain in return, while stocks that reach the lower 
static or dynamic limits experience a loss in return. Our results are in favor of our hypotheses.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the return gain or loss of reaching limits is subsequent of 
historical event. Thus, to avoid any speculations, we look at stock return one day before and after 
the event day. Our results still hold that stocks that reach the upper static or dynamic limits 
experience a gain in return, while stocks that reach the lower static or dynamic limits experience 
a loss in return. 
We also investigate whether stock size plays a role in the impact of static and dynamic VI on 
stock return. We sort stocks by their size and find that when small stocks reach a static or dynamic 
limit, they tend to gain higher returns compared to larger stocks. 
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Table 22 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. 
The independent variables are “Static Upper” which is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the 
conditions in (1a) or (1b) is met and zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book 
value per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” 
calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded 
volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses 
are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from 
September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
 
Large 
Market Cap 
Small 
Market Cap 
 Log (Return) 
Static Upper 
0.14 a 0.16 a 
(11.35) (13.24) 
B/M 
- 0.0003 b - 0.003 a 
(-2.09) (-4.09) 
Size 
1.17e-08 a 1.52e-06 a 
(4.20) (3.88) 
Lagged 
Return 
- 0.04 a - 0.12 a 
(-5.63) (-4.75) 
Illiquidity 
- 0.0003 a - 0.0002 b 
(-4.18) (-2.11) 
VOL 
3.90 a 0.26  
(7.98) (0.31) 
ROE 
0.001 0.01 a 
(1.32) (4.61) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
S.E. 
Clustered by 
Firm Firm 
N 137,828 98,679 
Adj R2 4.37% 20.45% 
            a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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Table 23 reports the results of estimating equation (12). The dependent variable is the logarithmic return. 
The independent variables are “Dynamic Upper” which is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the 
conditions in (3a), (3b) or (3c) is met and zero otherwise, “B/M” Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book 
value per share relative to the closing price, “Size” is the market value “in thousands of Swedish Krona” 
calculated as the stock closing price times the number of ordinary shares in issue, “ILLIQ” is Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure calculated as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return over the Krona traded 
volume for each stock, “VOL” is the simple volatility, and “ROE” is firm return on equity. In parentheses 
are t-statistics calculated using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) corrected standard errors. The sample period is from 
September 30, 2010 to December 29, 2017 for 344 stocks listed in Nasdaq Stockholm. 
 
 
Large 
Market Cap 
Small 
Market Cap 
 Log (Return) 
Dynamic 
Upper 
0.056 a 0.071 a 
(28.66) (19.09) 
B/M 
- 0.0002 - 0.003 a 
(-1.23) (-4.63) 
Size 
1.27e-08 a 2.45e-06 a 
(3.64) (4.49) 
Lagged 
Return 
- 0.04 a - 0.10 a 
(-6.15) (-3.42) 
Illiquidity 
0.0004 a 0.001 a 
(3.54) (5.92) 
VOL 
-5.95 a -14.94 a 
(-7.49) (-11.85) 
ROE 
0.003 a 0.01 a 
(3.57) (4.45) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
S.E. 
Clustered by 
Firm Firm 
N 137,828 98,679 
Adj R2 18.17% 28.16% 
            a) significant at 1% , (b) significant at 5%  and (c) significant at 10% 
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